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A variety of information escrows—including allegation escrows, suspicion 
escrows, and shared-interest escrows—hold the promise of reducing the 
first-mover disadvantage that can deter people with socially valuable pri-
vate information from disclosing that information to others. Information 
escrows allow people to transmit sensitive information to a trusted  
intermediary, an escrow agent, who only forwards the information under 
prespecified conditions. For example, an allegation escrow for sexual har-
assment might allow a victim to place a private complaint into escrow with 
instructions that the complaint be lodged with the proper authorities only 
if the escrow agent receives at least one additional allegation against the 
same individual. We assess the benefits and costs of allegation escrows and 
discuss how they might be applied to a variety of claims, including sexual 
harassment, date rape, adultery, and corporate and public whistle-
blowing. We also show how analogous shared-interest escrows might be 
used in workplace dating and adoption contexts to facilitate the discovery 
of parties’ mutual interest when unintermediated expressions of interest 
might themselves be harassing.  
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Introduction  
A familiar narrative of sexual harassment begins with a reluctant initial 
allegation of abuse that is quickly followed by other accusers stepping for-
ward with similar allegations. A victim of abuse is reluctant to bring the first 
claim, in part because the accused routinely responds by trying to impeach 
the credibility of the accuser, characterizing the accuser as “a nut or a slut.”1 
This initial claim aversion is a rational concern. In a “he said / she said” 
credibility contest, an uncorroborated accusation of harassment is unlikely 
to prevail. Though initial accusations often inspire additional allegations 
from other victims that can serve to corroborate the initial claim, isolated 
claimants deciding whether to make the first accusation often cannot be sure 
whether other victims exist and whether those other victims will have the 
courage to make a supporting allegation. Victim reluctance to take on the 
risk of “going it alone” gives rise to the well-known concern that there 
might be a substantial underreporting of harassment.2 Even recidivist har-
assers may go unchallenged because, among isolated victims, there can be a 
first-mover disadvantage to making the initial accusation. A challenge for 
public policy is to seek out ways to encourage victims of sexual harassment 
to take on the risks associated with making initial allegations.3 
                                                                                                                      
 1. Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 Yale L.J. 509, 518 (1992). In a study con-
ducted by the American Association of University Women (“AAUW”), the AAUW found 
based on student survey responses that only 7 percent of harassment victims on college cam-
puses report incidents to a school employee, and that 35 percent of harassment victims do not 
discuss their experience with anyone. Catherine Hill & Elena Silva, Am. Ass’n of Univ. 
Women, Drawing the Line: Sexual Harassment on Campus 32 (2005) [hereinafter 
AAUW Report]. 
 2. See, e.g., Rana Sampson, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Acquaintance Rape of Col-
lege Students 9–10 (2002) (listing several reasons for victim underreporting, including 
“[f]ear that the prosecutor will not believe them or will not bring charges”); Louise F. Fitzger-
ald, Suzanne Swan & Karla Fischer, Why Didn’t She Just Report Him? The Psychological and 
Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. Soc. Issues 117, 122–
23 (1995) (listing concerns that “nothing can or will be done” as a reason why some victims 
do not report sexual harassment and documenting the low success rate of victims who ulti-
mately litigate).  
 3. The stakes in this challenge are high, as the costs associated with continued har-
assment can be significant. As Chelsea R. Willness and others argue in their 2007  
meta-analysis of sexual harassment survey data, sexual harassment in the workplace appears 
to be negatively correlated with job satisfaction, employee productivity, and organization 
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Of course, not all accusations are true. The standard narrative can also 
be read as suggesting that there may be too many accusations. Once one or 
two accusations of harassment are lodged, it may become too easy for puta-
tive victims to make false, copycat accusations based on unsubstantiated 
accounts of alleged, long-ago events. While it may be comforting to infer 
guilt from the multiplicity of accusations, policymakers should also be con-
cerned about whether cascades of potential copycat complaints substantially 
enhance the likelihood of an ill-supported guilty finding. 
In this Article, we redeploy the game-theoretic “information escrow” 
technique to make progress on the twin concerns of underreporting of initial 
truthful allegations and overreporting of false copycat allegations. We pro-
pose the use of an allegation escrow to allow victims to transmit claims 
information to a trusted intermediary, a centralized escrow agent, who for-
wards the information to proper authorities if (and only if) certain 
prespecified conditions are met. Specifically, the escrow agent would keep 
harassment allegations confidential, unutilized, and unforwarded until the 
agent has received a prespecified number of complementary harassment 
allegations concerning the same accused harasser. For example, if the es-
crow agreement specified the accumulation of two additional allegations as 
a triggering event, then the agent would wait until the escrow had received 
three separate allegations concerning a particular alleged harasser before 
forwarding the information to specified authorities and initiating a com-
plaint on behalf of the three alleging parties. 
An allegation escrow holds the promise of mitigating the first-mover 
disadvantage in making a complaint. A victim can place the first allegation 
into escrow with diminished fear that she will bear the sole brunt of the ad-
versarial reaction, and with confidence that her escrowed allegation will be 
released only if accompanied by at least one other allegation against the 
same individual.4 Information escrows might thus secure more initial allega-
tions because the alleging victim can rest assured that her initial allegation 
will not be seen unless it is part of a larger pattern of alleged misconduct. 
More precisely and more subtly, an allegation escrow helpfully creates 
uncertainty for the victim regarding whether she is making the initial allega-
tion. At the time of placing an allegation into escrow, an alleging victim will 
not know whether any prior allegations against the same offender have al-
ready been placed into the escrow. This means that an accuser will not know 
                                                                                                                      
commitment, and positively correlated with task and job withdrawal. Chelsea R. Willness, 
Piers Steel & Kibeom Lee, A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Consequences of Work-
place Sexual Harassment, 60 Personnel Psychol. 127 (2007).  
 4. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to a victim of sexual harassment as “she,” and to 
the wrongdoer as “he.” Of course, men are also victims of harassment, women are also ag-
gressors, and harassment can occur to both genders. AAUW Report, supra note 1, at 3. 
Similarly, within the university context, we discuss cases in which a professor is accused of 
harassing a student, when the reverse is also fairly common. See Eric L. Dey, Jessica S. Korn 
& Linda J. Sax, Betrayed by the Academy: The Sexual Harassment of Women College Faculty, 
67 J. Higher Educ. 149, 157–61 (1996); Elizabeth Grauerholz, Sexual Harassment of Women 
Professors by Students: Exploring the Dynamics of Power, Authority, and Gender in a Univer-
sity Setting, 21 Sex Roles 789 (1989).  
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at the time of making an escrowed accusation whether she is the first or the 
second (and triggering) accusation. This incomplete information also helps 
respond to the copycat concern. Absent collusion among the allegers,5 inves-
tigating authorities need not be worried that later-in-time allegations placed 
in escrow are false copycats of an initial escrowed allegation, for the simple 
reason that the subsequent allegers would not know that an earlier allegation 
had been made.  
Indeed, the possibility that different victims would independently—
behind the veil of the escrow—allege similar details of harassment could 
enhance the credibility of each allegation. If multiple students independently 
escrowed allegations that a particular professor’s harassment included inap-
propriate hugging, the very similarity of the professor’s modus operandi 
would be strong evidence that the allegations were true. In contrast, if it is 
widely known that a student accused a professor of sexually harassing her 
by inappropriately hugging her, then investigating authorities would need to 
consider whether subsequent complaints of inappropriate hugging by the 
same professor were triggered by reports of the first complaint. Besides the 
possibility of false follow-on allegations, there is also the possibility that 
subsequent allegers were inappropriately primed by their knowledge of the 
first accusation into reinterpreting the behavior of the accused as harassing.6 
But allegation escrows are not a panacea. While escrows hold the poten-
tial for mitigating the twin concerns of initial underreporting of truthful 
allegations and subsequent overreporting of false allegations, this Article 
will also discuss a variety of ways in which placing an intermediating es-
crow mechanism between allegers and investigating authorities might be 
counterproductive. Most importantly, we will consider circumstances where 
allegation escrows may reduce the sheer quantity of actionable complaints. 
In a world with escrows, some victims’ complaints will never exit the es-
crow mechanism. Therefore, we envision a system in which victims retain 
the right to go it alone by directly lodging a complaint even if they have 
previously placed an allegation in escrow. Indeed, we will discuss ways in 
which escrows can be designed to encourage and facilitate subsequent con-
versions of escrowed allegations into independent go-it-alone complaints. 
But there remains the possibility that an escrow system would leave some 
harassment uninvestigated and some harassers undeterred. Even if, on the 
whole, escrows would increase the quantity and quality of deterrence, some 
unpaired escrow allegations could remain forever impounded. An important 
goal of the subsequent analysis is to determine the circumstances under 
which the benefits of escrows outweigh their costs. 
Allegation escrows come in many shapes and sizes. In the following 
Sections, we will discuss design issues (including more detail on triggering 
                                                                                                                      
 5. We discuss the possibility of collusion below. See infra note 69 and accompanying 
text. 
 6. As we discuss below, although follow-on allegations based on triggered reinterpre-
tation of the past are a good thing, escrows can also help when individuals are uncertain about 
whether they are victims. See infra text accompanying notes 54–56. 
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events, interim reporting, and matching criteria) and legal issues (including 
the legal relationship between the escrow agent and the escrow depositors, 
and what duties, if any, are owed to the accused). We will also show that 
information escrows might be applied to many different types of infor-
mation. At least conceptually, allegation escrows can be applied to almost 
any context in which victims experience claim aversion because of a reluc-
tance to go it alone.7 As we’ll see, allegation escrows might be used in the 
workplace not only to respond to instances of sexual and racial harassment, 
but also as a complementary tool to protect whistle-blowers in making alle-
gations concerning corporate or government misconduct. Outside of the 
workplace, escrows might be put in place to respond to allegations of date 
rape, an area in which claim aversion similarly leads to well-recognized 
problems of underreporting.8 Indeed, we’ll see that it might even be possible 
to create “suspicion escrows,” where mere suspicions of adultery or other 
misconduct could, if matched, be disclosed.  
Ultimately, we will conclude that the case for deploying information es-
crows is stronger in some contexts than in others. The mere fact that an 
information escrow attracts deposits does not mean that it is valuable to so-
ciety. Allegation escrows might unhelpfully reduce deterrence by converting 
what would have been unintermediated complaints into escrowed allega-
tions. Therefore, we find that allegation escrows are most likely to be 
valuable when the unescrowed equilibrium includes underreporting of truth-
ful allegations and when wrongdoing is likely to be known by more than 
one person. Shared-interest escrows are more likely to be valuable when an 
unintermediated communication would be unwanted or when common 
knowledge of unilateral interest would damage a preexisting relationship. 
Our weighing of the pros and cons suggests that allegation escrows for sex-
ual harassment in the university setting is a particularly strong candidate for 
productive deployment of the escrow mechanism.  
The remainder of the Article is organized into two parts. Part I discusses 
the game-theoretic underpinnings of information escrows and the connec-
tions between settlement escrows and other mechanisms that intermediate 
communication. It lays out the conditions under which allegation escrows 
are likely to improve the equilibrium that would exist with unintermediated 
communication. Part II then applies this theory to the facts on the ground to 
assess whether information escrows are likely to be valuable in different 
contexts. Part II also focuses more directly on the legal structure of escrow 
                                                                                                                      
 7. See, e.g., Brian Martin, Whistleblowing and Nonviolence, 24 Peace & Change 15, 
19–20, 23 (1999) (noting how, in the whistle-blowing context, “isolated resistance is  
ruthlessly crushed” and suggesting that whistle-blowers would gain much from mobilizing 
and working together with other whistle-blowers); see also William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. 
Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, 
Claiming . . ., 15 Law & Soc’y Rev. 631 (1980) (identifying other barriers to victims bring-
ing claims).  
 8. See, e.g., Sampson, supra note 2, at 4; Ian Ayres & Katharine K. Baker, A Separate 
Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 599, 637 (2005).  
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relationships in these different contexts and the legal consequences of both 
communicated and uncommunicated escrow information.  
I. Information Escrows in Action 
We begin by providing a functional typology of information escrows and 
their relationship to the previous literature. Most basically, an information 
escrow is a mechanism of conditional, intermediated communication. In-
formation escrows allow the user to deposit information into an escrow 
lockbox with instructions to the escrow agent that the information only be 
released to prespecified recipients under prespecified circumstances. While 
one can imagine instructions that give escrow agents some discretion about 
when to release the information, real-world applications of information es-
crows tend to follow the structure of financial escrows by attempting to 
eliminate the discretion of the agent.9 Escrow agents need to be trusted, but 
their function tends to be largely ministerial. While bilateral contracts and 
the law itself can create duties of conditional disclosure, information es-
crows are mechanisms for intermediated disclosure that necessarily entail 
the participation of a third-party intermediary who holds the escrowed in-
formation. 
At first, it might seem that intermediation would reduce the quantity of 
transmitted information. After all, the escrowing of information necessarily 
represents a delay in transmission relative to unintermediated, immediate 
communication. Moreover, some of the escrow applications—including 
both the allegation and shared-interest escrows described above—create the 
possibility of orphaned escrow deposits that remain eternally locked in es-
crow because the requisite conditions for release are never met. 
Nonetheless, information escrows can support equilibria that end with 
greater, higher-quality, and even faster disclosure of information. Though it 
may seem that delaying the release of information for a potentially indefi-
nite period would degrade the equilibrium quality of communication, 
contexts in which the amount and quality of information transmitted are not 
constant could see an overall increase in equilibrium quality. When people 
are reluctant to be the first person to make an allegation or express inter-
est—in short, when there is a first-mover disadvantage to unintermediated 
communication—then intermediating information escrows can induce a 
more informed equilibria. A world with delayed and even orphaned escrow 
deposits can still have more communication simply because the escrow 
might encourage many to communicate indirectly what they would have 
been unwilling to disclose directly.10  
                                                                                                                      
 9. Escrow mechanisms, however, at times, give escrow agents discretion on whether to 
accept information deposits. For example, bills have been proposed where convicts may have 
to petition a court conditionally to expunge a criminal conviction. See infra note 16 and ac-
companying text. 
 10. The nonintuitive possibility that giving people an option of impeded communica-
tion would produce a more informed equilibrium parallels an argument made by Jennifer 
Gerarda Brown and Ian Ayres in discussing the information-filtering role of caucus mediation 
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A. Commitment and Posthumous Escrows 
There are at least four different functional classes of information es-
crows. The bulk of this Article will be devoted to one, as yet 
unimplemented, class—what we call allegation escrows. But before turning 
to our theory about how best to structure these devices, we pause briefly in 
the remainder of this Part to mention the functions of three other types of 
information escrows that have already seen real-world applications. We call 
these three broad categories the following: commitment escrows, posthu-
mous escrows, and shared-interest escrows.11  
In a commitment escrow, the depositor puts into escrow embarrassing or 
incriminating information that will be released if the depositor fails to keep 
a commitment. For example, in 1971, the Nobel Prize–winning economist 
Thomas Schelling wrote about a Denver addiction clinic that used “self-
blackmail as part of its therapy”: 
The patient may write a self-incriminating letter that is placed in a safe, to 
be delivered to the addressee if the patient, who is tested on a random 
schedule, is found to have used cocaine. An example would be a physician 
who writes to the State Board of Medical Examiners confessing that he has 
violated state law and professional ethics in the illicit use of cocaine and 
deserves to lose his license to practice medicine.12 
In this example, the clinic is the escrow agent with a literal lockbox that will 
only be opened if the depositor fails to keep his commitment. While deposi-
tors to dating escrows hope that the conditions of escrow release are 
fulfilled, the depositor to a commitment escrow hopes that the conditions of 
escrow release are not fulfilled. 13  Similarly, in 2006, Barry Nalebuff  
                                                                                                                      
mechanisms. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 
80 Va. L. Rev. 323, 357 (1994). 
 11. As this Article was being edited for publication, Colin Sullivan of Yale University’s 
Office of Cooperative Development discovered a patent application that relates to some of the 
escrow implementations discussed in this article. In 1998, John Ogilvie filed a World Intellec-
tual Property Organization (“WIPO”) patent application under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, 
No. PCT/US98/23841 (filed Nov. 11, 1998), for a business-method invention to use “comput-
er networks to both protect message contents by keeping them secret until a specified 
condition occurs.” Id. at 1. The patent application describes an “information escrow” that 
might be used, inter alia, by “a potential whistle-blower or other witness to some wrongful act 
or plot.” Id. at 1. The patent application describes the implementation of an information es-
crow with disclosure triggers and a network of dispersed escrow agents that would operate as 
“a ‘hidden choir’ which will sing when desired and otherwise remain silently ready in the 
background.” Id. at 4. In contradistinction to the allegation escrow described below, the 
Ogilvie patent does not contemplate escrow disclosure that is triggered by the deposit of a 
“matching” escrow deposit by another user. We discuss the existence of other information 
escrow patents infra in notes 31 and 40. 
 12. Thomas C. Schelling, Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays 78–79 
(2006); see also Ian Ayres, Carrots and Sticks 86–89 (2010) (discussing the Denver addic-
tion clinic and other examples of self-blackmail).  
 13. It would be possible to create a commitment escrow with information that the de-
positor wants to be communicated but that will only be released by the escrow agent if the 
depositor achieves some prespecified goal. For example, a commitment escrow might specify 
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designed a weight loss experiment for ABC’s Primetime, in which five 
overweight people deposited with producers (here, serving as escrow 
agents) unflattering photographs of themselves in skimpy bathing suits with 
the understanding that the photographs would be broadcast on national tele-
vision if the participants failed to lose fifteen pounds over the next two 
months.14 
Commitment escrows are implemented on a much broader scale in  
criminal databases, which conditionally expunge criminal records. Notwith-
standing the name, expungements generally do not erase information from 
the criminal database but instead place the information under seal.15 Some 
jurisdictions make the nonuse of expunged convictions conditional on the 
convict avoiding any additional crime for some period in the future.16 Con-
ditional expungements are forms of commitment escrows, in which the 
government is the escrow agent threatening to release unwanted information 
if the convict recidivates. 
Game theorists have also imagined the use of commitment escrows to 
overcome a kind of criminal’s dilemma. Imagine that Todd catches his 
friend Sarah red-handed having just committed murder. Sarah reluctantly 
feels compelled to kill Todd to make sure he doesn’t rat her out to the po-
lice. But before she goes to kill him, Todd discloses to her an equally 
incriminating piece of information about him that she can also reveal.17 In 
                                                                                                                      
that a desired proposal of marriage will only be forwarded if the depositor loses ten pounds. 
We have not encountered these “carrot commitment escrows” in practice, though. 
 14. One male worried that he wouldn’t be sufficiently self-conscious about having his 
overweight picture shown on TV, and so he also deposited into escrow an unflattering photo-
graph of his spouse as additional commitment motivation. To this same end, one could easily 
imagine the commitment website, www.stickK.com (which Ian Ayres cofounded), giving 
users the option of depositing into escrow embarrassing information that will only be released 
to the public or prespecified email addresses if the users fail to achieve their committed goals. 
See STICKK, www.stickK.com (last visited Aug. 16, 2012). The potential disclosure of some 
wrongdoing would be an additional layer of accountability that might powerfully motivate 
users to lose weight or complete a dissertation or business plan. While this Article was being 
edited for publication, a version of Nalebuff’s commitment escrow was offered by a new web-
site. See Aherk!, www.aherk.com (last visited Aug. 7, 2012). 
 15. Michael D. Mayfield, Revisiting Expungement: Concealing Information in the In-
formation Age, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 1057, 1057 (1997); Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our 
Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement Legislation, 39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1, 5 n.15 
(2008).  
 16. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4 (2004) (“However, in any subsequent prose-
cution of the defendant for any other offense, the prior conviction may be pleaded and proved 
and shall have the same effect as if probation had not been granted or the accusation or infor-
mation dismissed.”); Mich. Comp. Laws § 712A.18e (2002) (providing for expungement of 
juvenile criminal records for one-time offenders lacking felony convictions); H.R. 5393, 92 
Leg. Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2003) (bill proposing that expungement be conditional on receiving no 
subsequent convictions for four years). 
 17. See, e.g., Schelling, supra note 12, at 11. This type of dynamic may also be seen 
in the kidnapping context, where “[b]oth the kidnapper who would like to release his prisoner, 
and the prisoner, may search desperately for a way to commit the latter against informing on 
his captor.” Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 43 (1981). A downside of 
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this example, Todd, to save his life, has created a commitment escrow, mak-
ing Sarah his escrow agent. 
A second broad class of information escrow mechanisms concerns the 
posthumous disclosure of information. Presidents, Supreme Court justices, 
and other public figures may deposit into an archive information that will 
only be disclosed in the future after the death of certain people and/or the 
passage of a prespecified number of years.18 Unlike commitment escrows, 
where the depositors hope that the information is never released, posthu-
mous escrows seek to ensure the eventual disclosure of the information. The 
goal of such posthumous escrows is both to preserve the deposited infor-
mation and make sure that the ultimate release of the information is not 
disrupted by the death, disability, or changed preferences of the information 
depositor. Anna, for example, may intend to tell Henry when he turns twenty 
that he is not her biological son, but she may be worried not only about be-
ing unable to make the future disclosure, but also about being unwilling to 
make the disclosure. A depositor’s present self may worry that her future 
self will have different preferences or insufficient willpower to make the 
disclosure she currently desires, particularly when the disclosure desired is 
of sensitive information. Placing the information with a trusted, long-lived 
intermediary can reduce these risks.19  
Legal wills themselves can serve some of these functions.20 For exam-
ple, it might only be at the posthumous reading of a last will and testament 
that the decedent’s attorney (qua escrow agent) for the first time discloses 
that the decedent had not in fact graduated from college or that the decedent 
long ago fathered a child. The website Just In Case I Die provides a post-
humous escrow service to help clients send time-delayed messages: 
[T]here’s probably loads of things you would like people to know (“I love 
you” / “The safe combination is 1432” / “I always thought you smelt of 
fish”) that you simply can’t bring yourself to saying whilst you’re still 
alive to suffer the consequences. Imagine the freedom of knowing that 
they’ll only find out if you never return from your trip to Spain!21 
Some of the website’s suggested uses are closer to commitment escrows, but 
seek to commit a third party from taking an unwanted action: “Going on a 
blind date? Not sure if he’s a mass murderer? Drop an email to 
help@police.com with his name and address, safe in the knowledge that if 
                                                                                                                      
being without sin is that you may not have the means to resort to this protective strategy. Peo-
ple who have ignoble secrets have something to exchange.  
 18. Adam Clymer & Don Van Natta Jr., Family of Robert F. Kennedy Rethinks His 
Place at Library, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2011, at A1.  
 19. Time capsules are another example of posthumous escrows—they allow the deposi-
tors to preserve the deposited information and communicate with future generations.  
 20. A future testator may revoke a prior will and leave the information undisclosed.  
 21. Justincaseidie.com, http://justincaseidie.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2011).  
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true love blossoms, you can safely log in and stop the message!”22 The web-
site ingeniously presumes by default that the depositor has died and 
automatically sends the message to the prespecified email address unless the 
depositor logs on to prevent the transmission. 
Another kind of posthumous escrow that helps ensure the disclosure of 
information regardless of the depositor’s potentially changed future prefer-
ences is called the “software escrow.” This type of escrow is in widespread 
use in business. A software escrow, for instance, might require a software 
developer to place in escrow the uncompiled code of a program that has 
been specifically tailored for use by a licensing business.23 The escrow agent 
would only release the code to the licensing business if the developer de-
clared bankruptcy or if other prespecified events occurred. 
B. Shared-Interest Escrows 
A third broad class of information escrows, what we call “shared-
interest escrows” (or more simply “interest escrows”), includes  
implementations that have been the most formally modeled in the academic 
literature and the most consciously put into practice. We begin by discussing 
“settlement escrows,” where the parties express their interest in settling a 
dispute or negotiation by depositing offers into escrow. In 1983, Kalyan 
Chatterjee and William Samuelson analyzed a negotiation mechanism in 
which a potential buyer and seller simultaneously deposited sealed bids to a 
third party. The third party was to announce a trade if (and only if) the bids 
overlapped—meaning that the buyer’s bid had been higher than the seller’s 
bid.24 This game represents a kind of information escrow, where the offers 
are the information being deposited and the third party is the escrow agent 
who is instructed to only release the information under prespecified and 
nondiscretionary conditions. As with allegation escrows, the private utter-
ances placed into the settlement escrow are conditionally performative.25 
The complaint deposits that we discussed in the last Section might spring 
into life and launch investigation proceedings. The bid deposits of settle-
ment escrows are formal, conditional offers to trade—conditional on there 
being overlapping bids—at a price equal to the average of the overlapping 
                                                                                                                      
 22. Id.; see also Frederick Forsyth, The Day of the Jackal 64 (1971) (describing 
how a person who made a gun for an assassin used an escrow to make sure he wasn’t killed by 
the assassin by giving a letter to others to be opened if he didn’t come home alive). 
 23. This is also known as “source code escrow.” For a discussion of source code escrow 
and a summary of arguments for and against its use, see Walter D. Denson, The Source Code 
Escrow: A Worthwhile or Worthless Investment?, 1 Rutgers Bankr. L.J. 1 (2002). There are 
several companies that provide such services, such as EscrowTech International, Escrow-
Tech, http://www.escrowtech.com (last visited May 4, 2012), one of the leading source code 
escrow companies.  
 24. Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson, Bargaining Under Incomplete Infor-
mation, 31 Operations Res. 835 (1983). 
 25. See J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (2d ed. 1975) (introducing the 
concept of “performative utterances”). 
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bids.26 For example, if the buyer deposits a $100 offer, and the seller depos-
its an $80 offer, the escrow agent would announce to them that a contract 
had been formed at a $90 price. Shortly after Chatterjee and Samuelson 
published their article, Roger Myerson and Mark Satherthwaite published a 
pathbreaking paper, which still stands as one of the most foundational con-
tributions to the mechanism design literature, showing that the Chatterjee 
and Samuelson mechanism was the most efficient mechanism possible.27 
Myerson and Satherthwaite formally proved that, given the buyer and sell-
er’s private valuation information, there are no negotiation procedures that 
produce higher expected gains of trade.  
The power of the Chatterjee and Samuelson mechanism as a practical 
dispute resolution device is, however, severely limited by the requirement 
that the potential buyer and seller have only one opportunity to contract by 
placing single deposits into the settlement escrow mechanism. In 1995, 
Robert Gertner and Geoffrey Miller argued that settlement escrows could be 
beneficial even if they were merely a nonexclusive supplement to traditional 
bargaining and dispute resolution: 
We are interested in the effects of adding a settlement escrow to the exist-
ing bargaining game, not replacing the bargaining game with a different 
mechanism. In our approach, there is neither commitment to delay ordi-
nary negotiations pending the outcome of the escrow process nor 
commitment to avoid further bargaining if the parties fail to settle in the 
settlement escrow. We argue that, independent of the bargaining game that 
exists, adding a settlement escrow is likely to improve settlement and un-
likely to have any significant costs.28 
Laboratory experiments with Carnegie Mellon University students conduct-
ed by Linda Babcock and Claudia Landeo have shown that just giving 
disputants a settlement escrow option, even a nonexclusive one, can substan-
tially increase bargaining efficiency.29  
Nonexclusive settlement escrows have found considerable real-world 
traction. In 2001, the state of Nebraska mandated that all litigants “in district 
court civil actions that involve only monetary remedies” be given the oppor-
tunity to resolve their dispute by means of a settlement escrow administered 
by the Nebraska Office of Dispute Resolution.30 The United States Patent 
                                                                                                                      
 26. Chatterjee and Samuelson also posited that the price might be set so as to give a 
bargainer with greater bargaining power a larger fraction of the overlapping gains from trade 
(however, with an attendant loss in allocative efficiency). Chatterjee & Samuelson, supra note 
24, at 841. 
 27. Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral 
Trading, 29 J. Econ. Theory 265 (1983). 
 28. Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J. Legal Stud. 87, 
93 (1995). 
 29. Linda Babcock & Claudia M. Landeo, Settlement Escrows: An Experimental Study 
of a Bilateral Bargaining Game, 53 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 401 (2004). 
 30. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2924 (2008) (repealed 2009). The statutory provisions gov-
erning settlement escrows can be found in Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-2922 to -2929 (2008) 
(repealed 2009). The state’s Office of Dispute Resolution made available a useful guide to the 
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and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) deemed a 1998 patent application for 
settlement escrows to be novel and nonobvious and in 2001 issued a pa-
tent.31 This patent, which has been licensed to the online (and offline) 
dispute resolution facility Cybersettle, uses a nonexclusive version of the 
Chatterjee and Samuelson settlement escrow to facilitate “over $1.8 billion 
in claims” arising out of more than 250,000 cases.32 Several other websites 
offer or have offered settlement escrows.33  
Nonexclusive interest escrows have also been used outside of the dispute 
resolution arena. In a dating escrow, for example, one person deposits into 
escrow his or her interest in going on a date with another specific person. 
The escrow remains undisclosed unless the escrow agent receives a match-
ing escrow from the specified person indicating a matching interest to go on 
                                                                                                                      
escrow process. See Neb. Office of Dispute Resolution, A Guide for Settlement Es-
crow District Court Only! (2003), available at http://forms.justia.com/nebraska/statewide/ 
district-court/miscellaneous/form-for-party-wishing-to-participate-in-24567.html (last visited 
May 4, 2012). The program was discontinued in 2004 and the statutory provisions were re-
pealed in 2009. See L.B. 1, 101st Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Neb. 2009); Telephone Interview with 
Rachel Lempka, Dir., Neb. Office of Dispute Resolution (Aug. 5, 2011). While the escrow 
option was in place, litigants deposited 252 offers, but only one case ever settled using the 
escrow mechanism (apparently because most of the escrowed settlement offers were unrecip-
rocated). Interview with Rachel Lempka, supra. 
 31. See U.S. Patent No. 6,330,551 col.4 ll.51–56 (filed Aug. 6 1998) (issued Dec. 11, 
2001) (“The computer matches the settlement offer against the claimant’s demand and per-
forms its programmed calculations in order to determine whether or not a settlement has been 
achieved. Where the demand and offer intersect in accordance with preestablished conditions, 
settlement is reached.”). The patent application was filed three years after the publication of 
Gertner & Miller, supra note 28, but fails to mention Gertner and Miller as prior art. See U.S. 
Patent No. 6,850,918 (filed Nov. 29, 1999) (issued Feb. 1, 2005); U.S. Patent No. 6,954,741 
(filed Aug. 6, 1999) (issued Oct. 11, 2005); U.S. Patent No. 7,249,114 (filed Oct. 10, 2003) 
(issued July 24, 2007) (failing to reference Gertner & Miller, supra note 28). In 2001, the 
game theorist Barry Nalebuff with a host of coinventors unsuccessfully filed a patent applica-
tion expressly invoking the concept of “information escrows.” See A Negotiation Protocol 
Using a Third-Party Information Escrow, PCT/US01/12081 (filed Apr. 12, 2001). 
 32. How Cybersettle Works, Cybersettle, http://www.cybersettle.com/pub/home/ 
demo.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). The Cybersettle mechanism allows each disputant to 
deposit bids for up to three different rounds of bidding—testing each successive round for 
overlapping deposits. Russell Weiss, Some Economic Musings on Cybersettle, 38 U. Tol. L. 
Rev. 89, 91 (2006). The Federal Circuit in construing the ‘511 claims concluded that to prac-
tice the independent claims would “require the receipt of at least two demands and at least two 
settlement offers.” Cybersettle, Inc. v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., 243 F. App’x 603, 609 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). The Cybersettle mechanism also modifies the Chatterjee and Samuelson 
split-the-overlap price with a “20% exception”: “[T]he final settlement can never exceed the 
demand by more than 20%. For example, if the offer is $100,000 and the demand is $5,000, 
the case will not settle for the median ($52,500); it will instead settle for $6,000 (20% above 
$5,000).” Weiss, supra, at 91; see also Bruno Deffains & Yannick Gabuthy, Efficiency of 
Online Dispute Resolution: A Case Study, Comm. & Strategies, Oct. 1, 2005, at 201, 201 
(arguing that the Cybersettle mechanism “creates some crucial inefficiencies”).  
 33. See Melissa Conley Tyler & Di Bretherton, Seventy-Six and Counting: An Analysis 
of ODR Sites, in Proceedings of the ODRworkshop.org, Edinburgh, June 28, 2003, at 13 
(A.R. Lodder et al. eds., 2003) (providing as additional examples ClickNsettle, Intersettle, e-
settle.co.uk, MARS, Settlement Online, WeCanSettle, The Claim Room, WebMediate, and 
Dispute Manager). 
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a date. Nonexclusive dating escrows have been used at a number of colleges, 
giving graduating seniors the opportunity for a “last chance match” using a 
dating escrow algorithm.34 For example, at Yale University in 2004, the es-
crow matched 856 couples for a “last chance dance” from an escrow dataset 
of 5,143 “crushes” submitted to an online escrow database by 773 people.35 
The dating escrow is also available to undergraduates more generally at 
“anonymizing matching” websites, like GoodCrush, where more than 
30,000 crush deposits have been placed into escrow.36  The site’s free 
“CrushFinder” service allows students at more than two dozen colleges to 
enter the email addresses of up to five crushes. These objects of affection are 
invited to submit their own crushes. If (and only if) the email addresses of 
two similarly inclined people match is the information revealed.37 Crush-
Finder by some measures has found the kind of quick adoption reminiscent 
of Facebook. 38  When Princeton University undergraduate student Josh 
Weinstein launched the site in the spring of 2007 for his fellow undergradu-
ates, 30 percent of the student body signed up within twenty-four hours.39 
As with settlement escrows, the USPTO has found the crush escrow to be 
sufficiently novel and nonobvious to warrant patent protection.40  
Finally, shared-interest escrows have been used by a number of states to 
help intermediate the potential initial contact between adopted children and 
their biological parents. In general, state laws governing adoption records 
may be divided into open and closed systems.41 In the six states with open 
                                                                                                                      
 34. See, e.g., The Last Chance Match, Harvard Computer Soc’y, http:// 
www.hcs.harvard.edu/class2010/lastchancematch/register.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).  
 35. Nicholas Zamiska, Before Graduation at Yale, A Last Chance for Romance, N.Y. 
Times, May 30, 2004, § 14CN, at 6. The average depositor submitted more than six crushes—
leading to more matches than people submitting. See id. This suggests that at least some  
submitters were not looking to connect with that special someone but rather those special 
someones.  
 36. Crushfinder, GoodCrush, http://www.goodcrush.com/crushes (last visited May 4, 
2012). See generally Anonymous Matching, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Anonymous_matching (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (“Anonymous matching is a matchmaking 
method facilitated by computer databases, in which each user confidentially selects people 
they are interested in dating and the computer identifies and reports matches to pairs of users 
who share a mutual attraction.”). A half-dozen other websites have provided crush escrows—
including eCRUSH.com (targeted to the teen market and claiming “more than 1.6 million 
users and . . . more than 600,000” matches), DoYOU2.com, LiveJournal Secret Crush meme, 
SecretAdmirer.com (claiming 100,000 successful matches), someonelikesyou.com, crush-
link.com, and Crush Notifier (Facebook application). Id.  
 37. Crushfinder, supra note 36; see also Hannah Seligson, Will My Love Say Yes? Col-
lege Kids Ask This Website, Wall St. J., July 16, 2010, at W9. 
 38. See The Social Network (Columbia Pictures 2010). 
 39. Patricio Martinez, Online Dating Site Aims to Aid Lovestruck Cornellians, Cor-
nell Daily Sun, Feb. 12, 2010, http://cornellsun.com/node/40726. 
 40. U.S. Patent No. 5,950,200, at [54] (filed Jan 24, 1997) (issued Sept. 7, 1999) (titled 
“[m]ethod and apparatus for detection of reciprocal interests or feelings and subsequent notifi-
cation”). 
 41. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Access to Adoption Rec-
ords: Summary of State Laws (2009), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/ 
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systems,42 an adoptee is entitled to view his or her original birth certificate 
(containing the names of his or her biological parents) upon reaching the 
age of majority.43 In open states, adoptees are free to directly contact their 
biological parents. All other forty-four states have a closed system, under 
which the adoptee lacks the right to see her birth certificate and consequent-
ly lacks the means to directly contact her biological parents. 
However, forty-one of the forty-four closed states have implemented 
some version of shared-interest escrows that allows adoptees to initiate in-
termediated contact.44 Approximately thirty of the closed states maintain a 
“mutual consent registry,” essentially a shared-interest escrow, which per-
mits the exchange of identifying information upon the mutual consent of the 
biological parent and adoptee. Approximately twenty-two of the state mutu-
al consent registries presume the biological parent’s nonconsent.45 In these 
states, identifying information is not released unless the biological parent 
files an affidavit in advance affirmatively consenting to disclosure. Eight of 
the state mutual consent registries presume consent, requiring the parent to 
file an affidavit to prevent the release of identifying information at the 
adoptee’s request.46 Nine of the closed states plus Michigan and Alabama 
permit appointing a “confidential intermediary” to contact biological parents 
on behalf of an adoptee upon application by the adoptee. The intermediaries 
only forward contact information if a biological parent indicates a willing-
ness to make contact with the adoptee.47  
                                                                                                                      
laws_policies/statutes/infoaccessapall.pdf (surveying the approaches of various states with regard 
to access to adoption records and showing that some states allow access for adult adoptees while 
others are more restrictive).  
 42. See id. at 5 & n.13 (listing “Alabama, Alaska, Maine, [and] Oregon” as allowing 
adult adoptee access to original birth certificate upon request). Kansas and New Hampshire 
allow access to birth records as well. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-2423(b) (2002) (providing that an 
adoptee’s original birth certificate “may be opened by the state registrar only upon the demand 
of the adopted person if of legal age or by an order of court”); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 5-C:9 
(Supp. 2011) (“Upon written application by an adult adoptee, who was born in this state and 
who has had an original birth certificate removed from vital statistics records due to an adop-
tion, the registrar shall issue to such applicant a non-certified copy of the unaltered, original 
certificate of birth of the adoptee . . . .”). 
 43. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-9A-12(c) (LexisNexis 2006) (granting adoptees nineteen 
years or older access to original birth certificate).  
 44. Two of those forty-one states, Alabama and Michigan, are open adoption states. In 
these states the shared-interest escrows may serve as a middle ground between no contact and 
direct contact.  
 45. See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., supra note 41, at 4 (“Approximately 
30 States have established some form of a mutual consent registry . . . . However, eight States 
will release information from the registry upon request unless the affected party has filed an 
affidavit requesting nondisclosure.”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. at 5 & n.9. Private (or public) information escrows might provide additional 
options to adoptees and biological parents contemplating contact. For example, in open states, 
a nonexclusive escrow might facilitate contact between adoptees and biological parents in a 
more discrete and privacy-respecting manner than direct, unsolicited contact by the adoptee. 
Indeed, an escrow could allow the biological parent to indicate in advance that he or she 
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The shared-interest escrow is more than just an intriguing game-
theoretic curioso. Shared-interest escrows have been shown to be workable 
in a variety of contexts. Indeed, the dramatic success of interest escrows in 
the three different contexts of dispute resolution, dating, and adoption is one 
impetus for us asking where else the technique might be usefully employed. 
II. Using Allegation Escrows to Mitigate Initial Claim Aversion 
Our fourth and final class of information escrows, and one that is a cen-
tral focus of this Article, is allegation escrows. As introduced above, 
allegation escrows allow people to place actionable claims into escrow that 
will only be filed against a potential defendant by the escrow agent if a pre-
specified number of allegations are lodged against the same defendant.  
Allegation escrows share some of the same attributes as shared-interest 
escrows. With allegation escrows, the allegation depositor is trying to  
discover whether someone else exists who has a shared interest in filing a 
complaint against the same harasser. But unlike with settlement or dating 
escrows, the allegation depositor doesn’t know the identity of the person 
with whom she is trying to discover a shared interest or even whether such 
another person exists. Moreover, allegation escrows and shared-interest es-
crows have distinct rationales. Shared-interest escrows can help speakers 
overcome their reluctance of expressing interest directly to other potential 
depositors who may not share their interest. In contrast, the reluctance of 
allegation depositors to make direct claims does not stem from a fear about 
the response of other potential depositors. Rather, allegation depositors are 
worried about potential retaliation from nondepositors such as the accused 
harasser.  
The central function of allegation escrows is to respond to the possibility 
that there will be a first-mover disadvantage in claiming. This Part will ar-
gue that in some contexts—such as sexual harassment, our central 
motivating example—there will be victims who want to make a claim and 
are willing to file follow-on claims, but who are nonetheless unwilling to be 
the first and potentially only person to make a claim against a wrongdoer. A 
first-mover disadvantage of this kind can make the sexual harassment com-
plaint processes akin to a variety of other strategic contexts that exhibit 
                                                                                                                      
would prefer not to be contacted, thereby preventing the invasion of privacy that might result 
from even receiving notice that the adoptee would like to establish contact. Similarly, while 
existing websites often allow adoptees to contact their biological parents, an independent 
escrow could facilitate contact in the reverse direction as well. Through the escrow, biological 
parents could notify adoptees of the parents’ willingness to exchange information. Finally, 
though difficult, shared-interest escrows could support connections between adoptees and 
biological parents in the three pure “closed” states. Matching would need to occur among 
adult adoptees only, and would require sufficient information to match on bases other than 
name, such as date and place of birth. These practical realities might limit the number of suc-
cessful matches in closed-adoption states. The high emotional, medical, and other stakes 
might nevertheless justify the effort of developing and maintaining the adoption escrow mech-
anism. 
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“excessive inertia.”48 Sexual harassment can produce a kind of “claimant’s 
dilemma”—a dynamic version of the classic stag hunt game, in which  
sexual harassment victims prefer to coordinate and jointly file claims, but 
where each victim nevertheless individually chooses to defect by not filing a 
claim.49 In the original stag hunt game, two hunters are separated so that 
they cannot try to coordinate their behavior. But the claimant’s dilemma in 
some ways is even more severe because a sexual harassment victim often 
does not know the identity of other victims, or indeed whether there are any 
other victims.  
Economists refer to games with this kind of first-mover disadvantage as 
exhibiting the “penguin problem” based on the stylized interaction of a flock 
of penguins trying to fish:  
Hungry penguins gather at the edge of an ice floe, reluctant to dive into the 
water. There is food in the water, but a killer whale might be lurking, so no 
penguin wants to dive first. In such circumstances, individual rationality 
may lead a group to forfeit attractive opportunities, for example, a preda-
tor-free meal or an innovative new networked product.50 
In such circumstances, “[n]o one moves unless everyone moves, so no one 
moves.”51 A recidivist sexual harasser’s wrongdoing might go unchallenged 
because no one is willing to be the first (and potentially only) claimant to 
lodge a complaint.52 
But why exactly would victims of sexual harassment be more reluctant 
to bring an initial claim than a follow-on claim? We suggest that there are 
two related reasons. First, follow-on claimants face a reduced risk of retalia-
tion. A lone claimant’s credibility is more susceptible to attack. Initial 
claimants are more likely to be disparaged as liars who have either fanta-
sized or fabricated their harassments. Sexual harassment claims are a 
circumstance where claimants can find some measure of safety in numbers. 
A lone claimant of sexual harassment often presents adjudicators with a “he 
                                                                                                                      
 48. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, 
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 940, 940 (1986). 
 49. In a “stag hunt” game, two hunters must individually decide whether to hunt for a 
stag or a hare. Unlike a prisoner’s dilemma, it is a pure game of coordination, where each 
player would prefer to match the other player’s strategy. See John B. Van Huyck, Raymond C. 
Battalio & Richard O. Beil, Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordina-
tion Failure, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 234, 235 (1990). 
 50. Thomas R. Eisenmann, Platform-Mediated Networks: Definitions and 
Core Concepts 7 (2006) (discussing Farrell & Saloner, supra note 48). 
 51. Vince Kuraitis, Overcoming the Penguin Problem: Setting Expectations for EHR 
Adoption, e-CareManagement blog (Aug. 2, 2009), http://e-caremanagement.com/ 
overcoming-the-penguin-problem-setting-expectations-for-ehr-adoption. 
 52. As the disturbing example of former Pennsylvania State University coach Jerry 
Sandusky (which we describe in detail below) indicates, the need to mitigate these first-mover 
disadvantages is real and urgent. Many boys endured years of sexual abuse at the hands of an 
oft-repeat offender. It wasn’t until a first mover finally made some of the charges sufficiently 
public—years after the alleged abuse began—that the full scope of the allegations became 
known. See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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said / she said” choice of crediting either the account of the accuser or that 
of the accused. This credibility contest can become stacked in the harasser’s 
favor if the harasser has intentionally preyed on vulnerable victims who may 
worry that their allegations will not be believed. Even without overt retalia-
tion, initial claimants run the reputational risk that their contested claim will 
be rejected. In contrast, a follow-on claim presents the adjudicator with a 
“he said / they said” choice. As the size of the claimant pool increases, it 
may become more difficult for the accused to argue that the claimants are all 
crazed or disgruntled. A central risk to bringing an initial claim is that an 
initial claimant often cannot be sure that follow-on claimants will material-
ize to lend credence to her initial claim.53  
A second and subtler reason for initial claim aversion is that some po-
tential claimants may be uncertain about whether what they experienced was 
in fact harassment.54 A student, for example, might be uncertain whether a 
professor’s lingering hug crossed the line. This uncertainty might turn on 
whether a reasonable student would find the hug unwanted or whether the 
professor possessed the requisite mens rea to make the act wrongful in the 
claimant’s mind (regardless of whether it was sufficient for the law). How-
ever, this same student might feel very differently about bringing a  
follow-on claim upon learning that other students had also found the profes-
sor’s behavior objectionable. In short, waiting to be a follow-on claimant 
can reduce “wrongdoing uncertainty.” Potential claimants will experience 
different degrees of wrongdoing uncertainty—in part because of differences 
in disposition, but especially because of differences in the type of wrongdo-
ing they have experienced. Blatant forms of sexual quid pro quo or sexual 
assault are unlikely to leave a victim uncertain that a harm has been perpe-
trated. But at times, even the victims of acquaintance rape report being 
uncertain about whether a sexual encounter was sufficiently nonconsensu-
al.55 Victims may find follow-on complaints more attractive than first-mover 
allegations because knowing that others have found similar actions by the 
accused wrongful can increase confidence in their own claims.56 
A. Modeling the Impact of Escrows on the Communication Equilibrium 
If all of the potential victims of a harasser hesitate to bring an initial claim 
because of retaliation risk or wrongdoer uncertainty, even the harassment of 
repeat offenders may go unchallenged. The first-mover disadvantage to 
                                                                                                                      
 53. And even when follow-on claimants do come through, the first accuser might expe-
rience relatively greater overt and reputational harm.  
 54. See AAUW Report, supra note 1, at 38. 
 55. See Bonnie S. Fisher et al., Reporting Sexual Victimization to the Police and Oth-
ers: Results from a National-Level Study of College Women, 30 Crim. Just. & Behav. 6, 8 
(2003).  
 56. Similarly, in less egregious cases of harassment, complainants may be more willing 
to excuse a harasser if the harassment appears to be a one-time incident or mistake. 
Knowledge of repeated episodes might thus make complainants both more certain of and more 
offended by improper behavior.  
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claiming can lead to the oft-discussed underreporting problem.57 Allegation 
escrows can mitigate the first-mover disadvantage by reducing retaliation 
risk, reputational risk, and wrongdoer uncertainty. A victim making a depos-
it to an allegation escrow does not know whether she is the first victim to 
make such a deposit, but she can rest assured that her complaint will only be 
passed on to authorities if at least one other person lodges a similar com-
plaint. Instead of forcing a claimant to decide whether she wants to make a 
claim before or after potential fellow victims, allegation escrows allow vic-
tims to make what is informationally equivalent to simultaneous claims. 
Even though the escrow will receive allegations over time, the escrow agent 
will only release them simultaneously.  
A claimant can further rest assured that, if her complaint is forwarded, it 
will not just be her word against that of the accused. She knows there will 
be a formal complaint if and only if at least one other person found some-
thing about the accused’s conduct worthy of investigation. At the time of 
making the allegation, she does not know whether there are other claimants, 
but she does know that she will not be alone in any formal complaint that is 
filed. Accordingly, some sexual harassment victims who would have pre-
ferred silence to filing an initial complaint may be willing to deposit their 
allegation in escrow.  
But to be clear, there is no a priori reason why giving victims the escrow 
option would increase the number of harassment investigations. In a world 
with escrows, some victims who otherwise would have been willing to go it 
alone and file an initial allegation will instead prefer to place that allegation 
in escrow. Some of these escrow allegations will never see the light of day. 
Indeed, a one-off harasser unambiguously faces less risk of investigation as 
long as there is some probability that the sole victim will make her claim 
ineffectual by sending it into escrow. Thus, the case for allegation escrows 
will be weaker if a larger proportion of potential escrow users would other-
wise be willing to go it alone with initial unescrowed claims, or if a smaller 
proportion of harassers are repeat offenders.  
To explore more precisely the circumstances under which the escrow op-
tion will increase the probability of lodged complaints, this Section analyzes 
a highly stylized model of sexual harassment in a university setting. First, 
imagine a three-stage harassment/claiming game without escrows. In stage 
1, professors have an opportunity to harass 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 students. In stage 
2, victims of harassment have the option of remaining silent or simultane-
ously bringing independent claims.58 In stage 3, victims who remained silent 
                                                                                                                      
 57. See AAUW Report, supra note 1, at 32–33 (discussing underreporting by stu-
dents).  
 58. In the real world, harassment takes place over time and victims choose over time 
whether to file complaints. However, to allow for more tractable estimation, we’ve assumed 
that the harassment takes place in an initial stage that might span five years, while victims 
(uninformed about whether other students were harassed by the same professor) must simulta-
neously and independently choose whether to file an initial complaint. While the assumption 
of simultaneity abstracts from reality, many universities keep the identity of harassment de-
fendants nonpublic, see discussion infra accompanying notes 60–61, so that students are often 
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in stage 2 can bring follow-on complaints. This model requires parameters 
for the following: 
F(x) the probability that a professor at the school will harass x = 0, 1, 2, 3, 
or 4 students; 
pd the probability that a victim will bring an initial stage 2 direct com-
plaint; and 
pf the probability that a victim who was silent in stage 2 but sees that a 
complaint was filed in stage 2 against her harasser will bring a stage 
3 follow-on complaint.  
This simple model captures two stylized facts about harassment claimants: 
(1) not all victims are willing to file initial claims (pd < 1); and (2) some 
victims who are not willing to bring initial claims are willing to claim if 
they learn that another claim has been filed against their harasser (pf > 0). 
With values for these parameters, it is possible to simulate the probability 
that a harassing professor will be investigated.  
To construct an alternative world in which escrows are allowed, assume 
that in stage 2 victims have the additional option of filing their allegation in 
escrow. If at least the triggering number of escrowed allegations is lodged 
against a professor in stage 2, then the escrow agent makes the professor’s 
identity public by formally lodging a complaint. In stage 3, previously silent 
victims may come forward and file follow-on complaints to either the stage 
2 direct complaints or the stage 2 escrowed allegations that have reached the 
requisite numerosity for release. To simulate this escrow alternative, we 
need to additionally provide parameter values for the following: 
T the number of escrowed allegations against a specific professor that 
triggers the release of those escrows in stage 2; 
αd the proportion of victims who in a world without escrows would have 
filed direct claims in stage 2 but in a world with escrows choose to 
escrow their allegations; and 
αs the proportion of victims who in a world without escrows would have 
remained silent in stage 2 but in a world with escrows choose to es-
crow their allegations. 
Producing plausible values for these parameters is no easy task. Estimates 
about victim preferences in an as-of-yet counterfactual world in which es-
crowed reporting is available is, of course, speculative at best. As a starting 
point, we relied on the wisdom of the crowd, informally asking a mixture of 
professors and students for their assessment, and simulated the equilibrium 
with and without the escrow option using the typical response for each pa-
rameter. To aid the reader in estimating alternative parameter values, we 
                                                                                                                      
uninformed about whether a prior complaint has in fact been filed—which creates an analo-
gous strategic setting for potential complainants. 
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have put on the internet an Excel file that allows users to run their own 
simulations.59 
Table 1 reports the results of this simulation and shows that for these as-
sumed parameter values, the escrow option increases both the probability 
that a harassing professor will be investigated and the quantity of evidence 
available for the investigation:  
Table 1 
Simulation Example in Which Escrow Option Increases  
the Number of Investigations and the Expected  
Number of Complaints Per Investigation 
 
With Escrow Without Escrow 
Percent Improvement (With Escrow 

































































after stage 3 
1 9.5% 1.00 1.00 100.0% 10.0% 1.000 1.000 -5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2 20.1% 1.14 1.29 86.0% 19.0% 1.053 1.242 5.6% 8.6% 3.7% 
3 30.7% 1.29 1.59 74.0% 27.1% 1.107 1.486 13.1% 16.2% 6.8% 
4 40.7% 1.44 1.90 63.6% 34.4% 1.163 1.731 18.3% 23.4% 9.6% 
Weighted 
Average 
31.2% 1.35 1.71 74.0% 27.3% 1.13 1.58 14.4% 19.5% 8.9% 
Based on simulation described in accompanying text with F(1) =.01; F(2) =.03; F(3) =.03; F(4) =.06; pd =.1; pf =.2; T = 2; αd =.5; αs =.15. 
 
For example, Table 1 shows that in a world without escrows, harassing pro-
fessors faced on average a 27.3% chance of being investigated, but that with 
escrows this probability increases to 31.2%—a 14.4% increase. The table 
also shows, however, that the probability of investigation varies for different 
types of professors. Professors who harass fewer students have a smaller 
chance of being investigated. We can also see the counterproductive impact 
of the escrow option with regard to professors who harass only a single stu-
dent. These one-off harassers face a 5% lower probability of being 
investigated in a world with escrows than without, because in this  
simulation 5% of victims who would have brought a direct claim choose 
instead to file an escrow claim that never sees the light of day. 
Table 1 also shows that giving victims the escrow option increases the 
expected number of complaints per investigation. We see in particular that 
the expected number of complaints increases for professors who harass 
more students. For example, without escrows, one-off harassers who are 
investigated will face just one complaint, while those who harass four stu-
dents and are investigated can expect to face 1.44 complaints after stage 2 
(based on the possibility of multiple direct complaints), and 1.9 complaints 
after stage 3 (based on the possibility of follow-on suits). The number of 
suits after stage 3 seems the most policy relevant because it represents the 
                                                                                                                      
 59. Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, http://www.ianayres.com/escrowsimulation.xls (last 
updated 2012). 
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total set of claims for investigation. But as we mention below, many univer-
sity policies on the identity of accused harassers are opaque,60 and there is 
little interschool consistency with respect to the accused’s right to confiden-
tiality during and after a formal investigation.61 Failure to publicly disclose 
the identity of the accused effectively forecloses the opportunity for follow-
on claims, unless the initial claimants are willing and able to publicize their 
claims. In such situations, the expected number of claims after stage 2 be-
comes a more relevant measure of the expected evidence that will be 
available to investigators. 
Table 1 also shows the potential value of giving victims the escrow op-
tion. The escrow option increases the expected number of complaints after 
stage 3 by nearly 9 percent and after stage 2 by nearly 20 percent.62 The es-
crow option in this example thus increases both the probability of 
investigation and the expected quantity of evidence that is before the inves-
tigator. But this simulation at most suggests the possibility that escrow 
regimes can enhance the probability of deterrence. Our admittedly crude 
model does not allow for the possibility of false claims and makes a host of 
other restrictive assumptions.63 
Nonetheless, the exercise is instructive because it may provide a heuris-
tic sense of how the results would be impacted by alternative assumptions. 
For example, Table 1 also calculates the proportion of escrow complaints 
that remain unmatched and unreported, or what we call “orphaned.” We see 
that 100% of escrow complaints lodged against one-off harassers are or-
phaned, and though this percentage declines for recidivist harassers, the 
overall probability that an escrow claim will be orphaned is nearly 75%. If 
the simulation is reestimated with a trigger of 3, this probability balloons to 
97.1% while the probability of harasser investigation falls by 2.7%. The 
theory is agnostic about the appropriate trigger. But our exploration of  
                                                                                                                      
 60. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Sexual Harassment and Assault 
Prevention Education in Yale College app. (2008) (providing a survey of Yale Universi-
ty reporting policies).  
 61. For one school policy that deals explicitly with the privacy rights of the accused and 
the general interest in confidentiality, see Brown University, Brown Sexual Harassment 
Policy (2012), available at http://www.brown.edu/about/administration/institutional-diversity/sites/ 
brown.edu.about.administration.institutional-diversity/files/uploads/SexualHarassmentPolicy.pdf. 
 62. After stage 3, the escrow advantage declines because the larger proportion of silent 
victims in the “no-escrow” regime catch up by bringing more follow-on claims. 
 63. For example, the simulation does not allow for different propensities of silent vic-
tims to file stage 3 follow-on claims in escrow and no-escrow regimes. We also hold the 
distribution of harassing professors constant in the two regimes, even though the higher likeli-
hoods of investigation and higher number of expected claims might deter some recidivist 
harassers. We also assume perfect or nearly perfect information with respect to reporting op-
tions. Relatedly the necessary publicity might inform some professors that their behavior is 
reportable, and potentially deter their harassing behavior. However, insofar as one ultimate 
goal is to reduce the prevalence of sexual harassment, such deterrence might nevertheless 
justify the use of an escrow system. 
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hundreds of alternative parameter values suggests to us that a trigger of 2 is 
likely to produce better results than a higher trigger.64  
The model also helps illustrate that giving victims the escrow option is 
not always a good idea. Table 2 resimulates claiming and investigating as-
suming the same parameter values as in Table 1, except increasing the 
probability that a victim will bring a direct complaint (pd) from 10 percent to 
70 percent:65 
Table 2 
Simulation Example in Which Escrow Option Decreases the 
Number of Investigations and the Expected Number of  
Complaints Per Investigation 
 
With Escrow Without Escrow 
Percent Improvement (With Escrow 

































































after stage 3 
1 66.5% 1.00 1.00 100.0% 70.0% 1.000 1.000 -5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2 89.4% 1.50 1.58 92.0% 91.0% 1.538 1.631 -1.7% -2.4% -3.3% 
3 96.8% 2.10 2.24 84.6% 97.3% 2.158 2.327 -0.5% -2.7% -3.7% 
4 99.0% 2.76 2.96 77.9% 99.2% 2.823 3.058 -0.1% -2.3% -3.3% 
Weighted 
Average 
93.8% 2.23 2.38 84.4% 94.6% 2.28 2.45 -0.9% -2.1% -3.0% 
Based on simulation described in accompanying text with F(1)=.01; F(2)=.03; F(3)=.03; F(4)=.06; pd=.7; pf=.2; T=2; αd=.5; αs=.15.
 
From Table 2, we see that a world with a relatively small underreporting 
problem is less likely to produce net escrow benefits. When most victims 
bring complaints, the escrow option is more likely to convert direct com-
plaint victims into escrows (thereby retarding deterrence) than to convert 
silent victims into escrows (thereby enhancing deterrence). Table 2 shows 
that it is also possible for the escrow option to reduce the probability that a 
harassing professor will be investigated and reduce the expected number of 
complaints per investigation. Table 3 goes a step further in exploring the 
conditions under which an escrow regime enhances deterrence by reporting 
the relative improvement in the investigation probability for eighty-one dif-
ferent simulations: 
                                                                                                                      
 64. It is of course possible that a higher trigger will induce more silent victims to file 
escrowed allegations. However, our investigation suggests that the increased probability of 
converting “silents” to “escrows” would have to be unreasonably large to offset the increased 
orphaning effect of a larger trigger. For example, we estimate, using the parameters of Table 1, 
that αs would need to approach 36 percent (more than double our current assumption) in order 
to offset an increase in the trigger from 2 to 3. 
 65. Available survey data suggest that 10 percent is closer to reality, but the sensitive 
context and vast secrecy make accurate estimates difficult. See AAUW Report, supra note 1, 
at 33 fig.10. The purpose of the table is to make clear that for certain parameter values the 
escrow option would degrade the information equilibrium. 
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Table 3 
Percent Improvement in Probability that Harassing Professor Will 
Be Investigated in a Regime that Allows Escrows Relative to a 
Regime that Doesn’t Allow Escrows 
  Probability that Direct Complainant Will Instead Escrow Allegation (αd) 







































5% 37% 33% 30% 27% 24% 21% 17% 14% 11% 
10% 14% 11% 8% 5% 2% -1% -4% -7% -10% 
15% 7% 4% 1% -1% -4% -7% -10% -13% -16% 
20% 4% 1% -2% -4% -7% -10% -12% -15% -18% 
25% 2% -1% -3% -6% -8% -11% -13% -16% -18% 
30% 1% -2% -4% -6% -8% -11% -13% -15% -18% 
35% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8% -11% -13% -15% -17% 
40% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8% -10% -12% -14% -16% 
45% 1% -2% -4% -6% -8% -10% -11% -13% -15% 
Based on same analysis as Tables 1 and 2. Holding constant the parameters F(1)=.01; F(2)=.03; F(3)=.03; F(4)=.06; pf=.2; T=2; and αd =.5, but 
varying pd and αs. 
 
The simulations in Table 3 simultaneously vary the probability that victims 
would bring a direct complaint in an escrow world (pd) and the probability 
that these direct complainants would instead escrow their complaint if given 
the escrow option (αd) (holding constant all of the other parameter assump-
tions of Table 1). Table 3 corroborates our previous discussion, in that to 
enhance deterrence, the escrow option is best deployed in contexts where 
underreporting is more severe or in which direct claims are unlikely to be 
converted to escrowed claims. 
These simulations at best scratch the surface of the possible permutation 
of parameter values that might be evaluated. More generally, we find that 
escrows are more likely to enhance deterrence as follows: 
(i) the probability of one-off harassers (F(0)) declines;  
(ii) the probability of direct complaining (pd) declines;  
(iii) the escrow release trigger (T) declines;  
(iv) the direct-to-escrow conversion probability (αd) declines; or 
(v) the silence-to-escrow conversion probability (αs) increases.  
In contrast, the relative level of deterrence from regimes with and without 
the escrow option is largely independent of the probability that silent vic-
tims will lodge follow-on complaints (pf).  
B. Additional Costs and Benefits of an Allegation Escrow Regime 
The foregoing simulations abstract away or simply ignore a variety of 
impacts that escrows might have on the claiming, investigating, and ulti-
mately the sanctioning of sexual harassment. For example, the model 
implicitly assumes that victims experienced similar types of sexual harass-
ment and had similar propensities toward bringing a direct claim. But we 
know that sexual harassment comes in a variety of forms. It’s possible that 
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victims will be more likely to bring direct complaints when the harassment 
is blatant and the harasser cannot preserve substantial plausible deniability. 
Hence, we expect that giving victims an escrow option would have a chan-
neling impact on claim selection, which is related to our previous discussion 
of wrongdoer uncertainty. This channeling effect might be a social good by 
fostering an equilibrium in which egregious forms of harassment are more 
quickly brought to the authorities, while less egregious forms would remain 
in escrow until they were buttressed with additional support. Indeed, under 
this reading, the fact that some escrowed claims remain orphaned might not 
be an unalloyed bad. 
More prosaically, an escrow option might also increase the quantity and 
quality of claims simply by providing a single, straightforward venue to 
lodge complaints. Grievance procedures at some universities have been crit-
icized for being confusing and opaque.66 A poorly implemented escrow 
system might add to the confusion and thereby deter victims from taking 
any action. But a well-designed escrow mechanism might provide victims of 
harassment with the ability to log on to a single portal and lodge either a 
direct or escrowed allegation. Creating a focal location on the internet with 
transparent, easily understood options might itself go a long way toward 
facilitating complaints from victims of sexual harassment,67 when it comes 
to inducing victims to engage in what Bill Felstiner, Richard Abel, and Aus-
tin Sarat have termed “naming, blaming and claiming,” framing matters.68 
Giving victims the escrow option is also likely to enhance the quality of 
evidence that is made available for investigation. In equilibrium, some vic-
tims who would have filed follow-on complaints (after learning of another 
complaint against the same harasser) will instead be moved to escrow their 
allegation. Escrowed allegations can provide superior evidence of harass-
ment to investigators for two independent reasons. First, the escrowed 
complaint reduces the risk of copycat allegations. Once an allegation of har-
assment is made public, it is possible for subsequent claimants to falsely 
mimic, either intentionally or unintentionally, the details of a harassment 
claim. Escrowed claims reduce this risk of piling on.69 Second, giving vic-
                                                                                                                      
 66. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 67. Indeed, we can imagine making participation in the escrow system a first-stage 
requirement for even those victims who choose to lodge direct complaints. Such primacy 
might help to publicize the system, and generate trust and interest for those victims who are 
reluctant to report harassment directly.  
 68. See Felstiner et al., supra note 7 (introducing the distinct requirements of naming 
and blaming as prerequisites to claiming); see generally Judith Berman Brandenburg, Sexual 
Harassment in the University: Guidelines for Establishing a Grievance Procedure, 8 Signs 
320 (1982) (providing a guideline for establishing a grievance procedure and an evaluation of 
the Yale College Grievance Procedure).  
 69. Of course, the risk of collusion may be higher in escrowed complaints than in  
direct, public complaints. This risk of collusion might be treated with other types of  
evidence—for example, evidence that the two escrow complainants attended school at differ-
ent times and live in different cities would make it less likely that they colluded in escrowing 
allegations against the same professor. In contrast, the risk of copycat allegations can occur 
without collusion, and collusion can occur in the absence of allegation escrow systems. 
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tims an escrow option gives them the opportunity to create a contemporane-
ous record of their abuse. An escrowed allegation might take years to come 
to light, but may be based on an account that is recorded much closer to the 
harassing events. 
Even without escrows, many victims preserve contemporaneous evi-
dence of their harassment through analogous, though more informal, 
mechanisms. Some victims tell a friend or relative what happened soon after 
the event. Telling a friend is itself a kind of allegation escrow. It is routine 
for investigators to rely on this kind of corroborating evidence to mitigate 
both the stale-evidence risk and the copycat risk. But even here allegation 
escrows offer important evidentiary advantages. An investigator or adjudica-
tor may worry that the testimony of a friend or relative, who would also be 
called on to remember a conversation from the past, is inaccurate or biased. 
In contrast, the evidence placed in escrow might include affidavits, photo-
graphs, and even video testimony, none of which alter or degrade with time. 
An escrowed allegation is more likely to contain the exact dates of harass-
ment than a victim or friend trying to recall what happened months or even 
years before.  
In addition, escrowed allegations are likely to be more detailed than 
those made to a friend. An entry in a personal diary or an email to a friend 
can, like a formal escrow, eliminate the faulty-memory concern, but these 
unaided, privately created records are more likely to leave important eviden-
tiary elements unaddressed. Lawyers, police, and rape-trauma counselors 
conducting intake interviews with victims proactively solicit information 
regarding evidentiary details of the wrongdoing. An escrow mechanism can 
be structured to guide victim depositors through a series of questions that 
are more likely to address all the elements of a sexual harassment claim. 
Indeed, an escrow mechanism might even give victims the option of deposit-
ing a sworn video deposition taken by an interrogator trained in the field. 
For all these reasons, an escrow regime might not only produce an equilibri-
um with more complaints per investigation, but also a better evidentiary 
foundation by providing better plaintiff evidence per complaint. 
But while allegation escrows are likely to mitigate the problem of stale 
plaintiff evidence, they do not solve the problem of stale defendant evi-
dence. Escrows can create asymmetric staleness. A professor who is falsely 
accused of harassing a student years ago will have a harder time presenting 
evidence of a valid alibi than a professor who receives more contemporane-
ous notice of the allegation. From the perspective of procedural fairness, 
allegation escrows can thus create an uneven playing field. An accused must 
rely on his fading memories, while the accuser has the possibility of pre-
senting a fixed record of her near-contemporaneous narrative. Moreover, the 
accused cannot confront the complainant’s prior self. He can only ask the 
complainant’s present self, who may no longer remember other issues rele-
vant to the defense. These kinds of concerns underlay statutes of limitations 
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and a host of evidentiary and criminal procedure protections.70 These famil-
iar concerns are heightened, however, in an escrow regime because the 
asymmetries are also heightened. An accused harasser might need to  
suddenly respond to multiple, well-preserved, near-contemporaneous  
allegations. 
One way forward is to provide the accused with an analogous escrow 
option. What we call a “defendant’s escrow” or an “anti-allegation escrow” 
would give potential defendants the option of making information deposits 
that give near-contemporaneous accounts of their own narrative. Some 
might, at first, interpret a professor making a deposit as itself evidence of a 
guilty mind. But there are circumstances in which a professor who is inno-
cent of harassment may nonetheless want to make a deposit because he is 
concerned that a student might make a claim based on a misconstrued re-
mark or action, or because the student has become disgruntled.  
This analogous escrow option can of course be misused by harassers to 
try to create false evidentiary records of the “she came on to me” defense. 
But such evidentiary manipulation is less likely to be effective as a response 
to multiple escrowed harassment allegations—for the simple reason that it 
becomes less plausible that there would be multiple people who inde-
pendently chose to punish their unrequited advances by making false 
accusations. Giving potential defendants an escrow option can help level the 
evidentiary playing field for at least some accused. But for others, the prob-
lem of asymmetric access to contemporaneous narratives will remain an 
issue with which adjudicators must grapple.71 
This scenario also raises72 a legitimate concern that the escrow option 
might increase the number of false complaints. It’s hard to construct a story 
where the escrow option would increase the number of false direct com-
plaints.73 But one might imagine a world where disgruntled students felt 
safer depositing a false complaint of harassment in escrow. The “safety in 
numbers” argument discussed above might apply as well to false claims. Or 
one might fear that bad-faith depositors might upload fabricated complaints 
in an effort to discover whether other students have submitted deposits for 
                                                                                                                      
 70. See generally David S. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-
Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 
1378 (1972). 
 71. The most concerning context is one in which the accuser lodges a complaint based 
on entirely fictional events. In such cases, the professor would have no reason to fear charges 
or make a defense escrow submission.  
 72. In the extreme biblical example from Genesis, Joseph might have had an inkling 
that Potiphar’s wife would make a false accusation of harassment after Joseph spurned her 
advances. See Genesis 39:7–20. Similarly, in To Kill a Mockingbird, Tom Robinson might 
have reasonably worried that Mayella Ewell would falsely accuse him after he spurned her 
advances. Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird (1960).  
 73. Although if an escrowed world radically increased the salience and publicity of 
harassment allegations, one might imagine that even false claimants would come to see direct, 
initial complaints as more “available.” See generally Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heu-
ristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87 Marq. L. Rev. 795, 800 (2004) (discussing the 
availability heuristic). 
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the same professor.74 It will be harder for a wrongfully accused professor to 
respond to a multifront war. Collusion among bad-faith complainants might 
also be more difficult to detect in a world with escrows than in a world in 
which direct complaints are the only option. Even the increase in escrowed 
reports of less egregious or less clearly violative conduct, which was  
discussed above as a benefit of the system, could become harmful if these 
negligible or unworthy claims are converted from silence to escrow.  
If the number of inappropriate escrowed or follow-on complaints in-
creases, the escrow option could increase the net Type II errors—that is, the 
number of factually innocent defendants who are mistakenly sanctioned. 
Although false claims would not automatically lead to sanctioning, a world 
with more false claims is likely, because of errors in adjudication, to lead to 
an increase in mistaken sanctions.75 The possibility of increased Type II er-
rors is especially worrisome because this possibility turns on information 
that is difficult to know in advance of or even after adopting the escrow op-
tion. As with interventions that seek to encourage date-rape prosecutions,76 
the net impact of escrows on Type I and Type II errors may turn on our per-
ceptions about the preexisting propensity of students and employees to bring 
truthful versus false complaints. If one believes that the primary existing 
problem of sexual harassment is Type I error—the nonsanctioning of har-
assers—prompted in large part by the underreporting of valid complaints, 
the escrow option may be justified as a means of inducing more reporting. 
On the other hand, some might argue that the escrow option will exacer-
bate the problem of Type I errors, even more than suggested by Table 2 
above. We showed that orphaned escrows could reduce the net quantity of 
true harassers who are investigated.77 One-off harassers are effectively im-
munized if the object of their harassment files only an escrowed claim. But 
the problem of Type I errors could also be exacerbated if, in a world with 
escrows, investigating and adjudicating bodies treated direct complaints by 
individual claimants less seriously. A concern with creating a new mecha-
nism for victim corroboration is that authorities might give less weight to 
uncorroborated claims. In a world with more “he said / they said” disputes, 
there may be insufficient attention paid to “he said / she said” adjudication. 
In the extreme, this concern might lead to a de facto two-bite rule—where 
harassers are effectively immune from sanction unless accused by more than 
                                                                                                                      
 74. As we’ll discuss in more detail below, allegation escrow systems can and should 
employ techniques to prevent such fishing expeditions, in large part because they can result in 
premature identification of the complainant and accused. No system is entirely impervious to 
bad-faith actors, however.  
 75. However, the social disutility of false escrow claims in a world with first-mover 
claim disadvantages is less clear. The maid, Nafissatou Diallo, who falsely accused 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn in some way improved social welfare because her false accusation 
was a but-for cause of Tristane Banon’s subsequent accusation which had lain dormant. See 
generally infra notes 123–124 and accompanying text. A world in which a false escrow depos-
it triggers release of a truthful deposit has, at a minimum, more complicated welfare effects.  
 76. See Ayres & Baker, supra note 8, at 637–40.  
 77. See supra Part II. 
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one woman. In part, this concern is likely to be mitigated by other sources 
of corroboration (e.g., witnesses or emails from the accused) that will at 
times be available to individual claimants. Moreover, the potential for  
increases in this type of error is likely limited by the difficulties that go-it-
alone claimants already face. In a world where unsupported claims are  
already treated with suspicion, it is less likely that the sudden existence of 
corroborated escrowed claims would noticeably decrease perceived com-
plaint credibility. Still, authorities reacting to a world with escrowed 
complaints should be on guard against diminishing the worth of unescrowed 
claims.78  
Stepping back, we see that the escrow options can produce a mixture of 
salutary and deleterious social impacts. While it will be impossible to pre-
cisely know when the positives will outweigh the negatives, this Section has 
shown that allegation escrows are more likely to have a net positive influ-
ence when (1) many instances of wrongdoing go unreported, (2) many 
wrongdoers are recidivists, (3) the proportion of false claims in the victim 
class is relatively small, and (4) potential defendants are given the offsetting 
option of depositing anti-allegation narratives into escrow. 
1. Legal Issues 
Moving beyond theory, the remainder of this Part grapples with difficult 
questions of implementation. We begin in this Section with the relationship 
between allegation escrows and the antidiscrimination mandates of Title IX 
and Title VII, and then turn to the legal relationship between the escrow 
“agent,” the depositor, and the sponsoring institution. 
a. Allegation Escrows in Post-Secondary Schools and Title IX 
Any mechanism for reporting sexual harassment in colleges and univer-
sities receiving federal funds operates against the background of Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits gender-based discrim-
ination in federally supported educational programs. 79  In Franklin v. 
                                                                                                                      
 78. Indeed, many institutions resist the idea of any seemingly anonymous complaint 
mechanisms. At Yale, for example, a 2010 report issued by the specially convened Sexual 
Misconduct Committee said the following:  
We do not recommend the creation of a specific website, hotline, or other venues through 
which anonymous reports are encouraged. Instead, we want to encourage confidential 
reporting; and, indeed, we worry that the explicit provision for anonymous reporting 
might discourage non-anonymous reporting. Non-anonymous (but still confidential) re-
porting is more useful both to the complainant and to the University.  
Report from the Sexual Misconduct Committee, Yale Univ. Office of the Provost (July 9, 
2010), http://provost.yale.edu/news-announcements/report-sexual-misconduct-committee.  
 79. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2006). 
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Gwinnett County Public Schools, the Supreme Court interpreted gender dis-
crimination under Title IX to include sexual harassment.80  
While Franklin declared that schools may be held liable when officials 
intentionally fail to end harassment,81 the Department of Education (“DOE”) 
has developed a complex regulatory scheme to ensure compliance with Title 
IX.82 Specifically, school officials must (1) investigate and address harass-
ment when they reasonably should know about the conduct, even prenotice, 
and (2) undertake some investigations even when victim confidentiality can-
not be assured. 83  These requirements may make schools reluctant to 
implement escrowed reporting systems, but may also increase the potential 
benefits of such systems to victims. Risk-averse schools may fear that feder-
al investigators would view any conduct related to an escrowed complaint as 
within those “reasonably should know” bounds, leading schools to incentiv-
ize public reporting as much as possible and to resist any “official” 
mechanism that fails to inform the school of alleged harassment. On the 
other hand, the requirement that all such complaints be investigated without 
guaranteeing confidentiality may heighten the concerns that keep victims 
silent in the first place.84 
                                                                                                                      
 80. 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992). Franklin addresses the claim of a female student that she 
had been repeatedly harassed by a male teacher, and that the school administration had both 
failed to remedy the situation and had pressured her to forego litigation. Id. at 75. Franklin 
builds on an earlier case, Cannon v. University of Chicago, in which the Court held that Title 
IX creates an implied cause of action for victims of sex discrimination, and that students need 
not exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing private litigation. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). In 
Cannon, the Court addressed Geraldine Cannon’s allegation that she had been denied admis-
sion to medical school on the basis of her gender. Id. at 690.  
 81. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74–75. The intentional-failure-to-act standard imposed in 
private suits is higher than the standard imposed in administrative enforcement cases. In ac-
tions seeking administrative enforcement, injunctive relief can be granted on the basis that 
school officials knew or reasonably should have known that sexual harassment was occurring. 
See Russlynn Ali, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence 4 & 
n.12 (2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201104.pdf. The letter is identified as “a ‘significant guidance document’ under the Office of 
Management and Budget’s Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 
3432.” Id. at 1 n.1; see also Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Revised Sexual 
Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Stu-
dents, or Third Parties 12–13 (2001) [hereinafter Revised Sexual Harassment 
Guidance], available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf. 
The requirement that a school or its responsible administrators demonstrate some inten-
tional failure to remedy issues of harassment distinguishes private suits alleging Title IX 
violations from private suits in the employment context (under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006)). As we discuss below, the regulatory 
implementation and judicial interpretation of Title VII establish a slightly lower standard of 
liability for employers facing private litigation for monetary damages. 
 82. See Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 81. 
 83. Ali, supra note 81, at 5–6.  
 84. See AAUW Report, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that fear of embarrassment is a rea-
son for underreporting); Nicole Allan, Confusion and Silence, Yale Alumni Mag., July–Aug. 
2011, at 38, available at http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/2011_07/feature_ 
titleix.html. The 2001 DOE Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance and other official  
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Nonetheless, an allegation escrow system might help schools fulfill their 
Title IX obligations. The Department of Education has suggested that one 
“reasonable” method of identifying harassment prenotice is seeking out cas-
es that resemble previously submitted complaints.85 Schools could utilize 
escrow systems to fulfill that obligation by submitting any claim received, 
and in the case of a triggered complaint, contacting the users whose es-
crowed allegations match. Administrators might further pursue their Title IX 
obligations by responding to aggregate data suggesting that a particular de-
partment, fraternity, or physical location on campus repeatedly engages in 
misconduct. While the specifics of unmatched deposits would not be re-
leased, the interim disclosure that a certain number of allegations of sexual 
misconduct had been deposited relating to a particular department might 
provide an impetus for administrators to take corrective action. 
b. Allegation Escrows in the Workplace and Title VII  
Closely related to harassment in colleges and universities is sexual har-
assment in the workplace, which is governed primarily by Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act.86 While Titles VII and IX share a common goal of prevent-
ing discrimination, differences in standards of liability and affirmative 
defenses may make employers even more reluctant to implement infor-
mation escrow systems than schools. Under Title VII, employers are 
required to take a much more active role than schools in the prevention and 
investigation of sexual harassment in the workplace.87 Indeed, the leading 
cases in Title VII suits for sexual harassment, Faragher v. City of Boca Ra-
ton88 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,89 indicate that a primary aim 
of Title VII is encouraging employers to prevent and quickly address sexual 
harassment. Much of Title VII jurisprudence focuses on whether employers 
have taken reasonable steps to prevent and promptly remedy harassment in 
their workplaces. Reasonable steps are often interpreted to mean providing 
harassment awareness training and reasonably accessible mechanisms for 
                                                                                                                      
documents direct schools to consult complainants’ wishes with respect to confidentiality and 
honor them where possible. See Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 81, at 
17–18. However, the documents acknowledge that schools may not be able to maintain com-
plainant confidentiality. Id. Furthermore, the DOE acknowledges that the accused’s due 
process rights may force a school to choose between breaching the victim’s confidentiality and 
being unable to pursue the investigation at all, which itself may carry administrative penalties. 
See id. 
 85. See Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 81, at 13 & n.77. 
 86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.  
 87. That is not to say that employers operate under significant liability burdens, howev-
er. As we discuss here, the existing Title VII framework, while less friendly to employers than 
Title IX is to schools, is still nevertheless very employer friendly.  
 88. 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (noting “Title VII’s . . . basic policies of encouraging 
forethought by employers and saving action by objecting employees”). 
 89. 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (“Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of anti-
harassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.”). 
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lodging harassment complaints.90 If an employee establishes evidence of a 
hostile work environment (which does not rise to the level of tangible em-
ployment action), the employer can avoid both compensatory and punitive 
damages by establishing the affirmative defense that the employer exercised 
reasonable care to address sexual harassment and that the subordinate com-
plainant unreasonably failed to take advantage of remedies available in the 
workplace.91 Such a focus on the employer’s actions and the get-out-of-jail-
free card that reasonable, employer-provided complaint mechanisms  
represent understandably make employers eager to uncover as quickly as 
possible any cases of harassment that could lead to litigation.92 
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders93 gives large-scale employers even 
more reason to focus on demonstrable steps to prevent and correct harass-
ment as a means of avoiding liability, and thus to fear unreported cases of 
harassment. Seemingly forging a middle path between the strict liability of 
tangible employment-action cases and the avoided liability of hostile envi-
ronment cases, the Supreme Court held in Suders that Title VII allows 
constructive discharge claims, and that such claims can, in the most severe 
cases, rise to the level of tangible employment actions.94 The Court also 
held, however, that in all but the most egregious constructive discharge cas-
es, employers will have recourse to the affirmative defense that the 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of employer-sponsored 
steps to prevent and correct harassment.95 This approach to constructive dis-
charge claims broadens employee access to courts in Title VII suits, as it 
removes the affirmative defense as a basis for summary judgment where 
there is a reasonable question as to whether the employee quit in response to 
harassment that constituted both a hostile work environment and a tangible 
                                                                                                                      
 90. Indeed, Lauren Edelman and colleagues argue that employers played an active role 
in shaping this area of Title VII law, and that the focus on employee sensitivity training and 
other internal mechanisms became entrenched in the law after first beginning in industry. For 
one of her first pieces on this issue, see Lauren B. Edelman, Christopher Uggen & Howard S. 
Erlanger, The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 
Am. J. Soc. 406 (1999). 
 91. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (“[A] defending employer may raise an affirmative defense 
. . . (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sex-
ually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid 
harm otherwise.”). 
 92. What’s more, employers also operate under some pressure to identify cases of har-
assment as soon as possible, as the amount of monetary and punitive damages are dependent 
in part on the duration of harassment of which the employer should have been aware. See, e.g., 
Blackmon v. Pinkerton Sec. & Investigative Servs., 182 F.3d 629, 636 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(“[D]uration of harassment [is a] relevant factor[] when determining the appropriateness of 
punitive damages . . . .”). 
 93. 542 U.S. 129 (2004). 
 94. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 148.  
 95. Id. at 148 (“To be sure, a constructive discharge is functionally the same as an actu-
al termination in damages-enhancing respects.”).  
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employment action.96 At the same time, however, by limiting the strictest 
standards of liability to only the most grave constructive discharge cases, the 
Court also increased the importance and prevalence of the reasonable-
employer-actions affirmative defense in Title VII cases. Suders thus serves 
to increase an employer’s interest in having publicly demonstrated mecha-
nisms for reporting harassment, but may also increase employer resistance 
to escrow-based reporting systems which do not automatically notify the 
employer of complaints.  
As with schools, employers should be able to develop allegation escrow 
systems that help, rather than hinder, their effort to comply with the re-
quirements of Title VII. The escrow service would merely represent an 
additional option for victims who are uncomfortable bringing forward direct 
allegations. But as long as victims could easily bring direct complaints and 
had the option of subsequently converting escrow deposits into go-it-alone 
direct complaints, an employer sponsoring an escrow service should be able 
to avoid Suders liability for failure to have adequate harassment reporting 
mechanisms. However, given the increasingly narrow focus on an employ-
er’s reasonable efforts to prevent and correct harassment, employers may 
nevertheless resist implementing escrow systems for fear that they will lead 
to a perception of employer indifference or even that employers are actively 
obstructing victims’ claims from seeing the light of day. These concerns 
might be allayed by evidence that harassment investigations increase after 
the introduction of the escrow option. But employers may nonetheless be 
concerned that courts would focus on the large proportion of orphaned com-
plaints that would eventuate in even successful implementations of the 
escrow. Whether or not their reluctance to implement escrowed reporting 
mechanisms is reasonable, employers may ultimately find the current Title 
VII framework too comfortable to risk changing.  
c. The Escrow System’s Relationship with Sponsoring Institutions  
Though specific requirements vary by jurisdiction and job sector, nearly 
all employees enjoy a legal or contractual right to review documents used by 
an employer in making hiring or employment decisions.97 As a result, any 
escrow system should be clearly and legally distinct from the companies 
that it serves. Before any escrowed allegations are accepted, the escrow ser-
vice should establish that the employer has no claim to any of the 
complaints lodged with the service. Indeed, the escrow service might not 
even have a contractual relationship with the companies at all. The service 
                                                                                                                      
 96. The Court also makes clear in Suders that even when the affirmative defense is 
available to the employer, the burden of showing that the employee unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of existing employer-provided systems falls on the employer. Id. at 146 (“Ellerth 
[and] Faragher . . . place the burden squarely on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff un-
reasonably failed to avoid or reduce harm.”). This burden allocation further limits the utility of 
the affirmative defense in summary judgment and other pretrial motions.  
 97. E.g., Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 103.13(2) (West 2012) (granting employees broad right to 
access personnel records subject to narrow exceptions). 
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might only enter into contracts with depositors to forward complaints under 
prespecified conditions. Regardless of whether the employer sponsors the 
escrow service, the employer should only be granted access to complaints 
when the escrow service chooses, in its judgment, to forward a match gen-
erated by the system.  
The independent juridical status of the escrow service would further in-
sulate the service from being held liable for the employer’s lack of response 
to gender inequality in the workplace. In addition, the escrow service would 
benefit from making explicit its right to use its judgment regarding matched 
complaints and whether they are suitable for forwarding to the employer or 
the authorities. Because there will inevitably be error in a process that oper-
ates in a realm of unproven allegations and vague descriptions, the escrow 
service should avoid any implication that it has an obligation to forward 
complaints that happen to meet certain criteria. Similarly, the legal inde-
pendence of the escrow service can help insulate employers from potential 
liability for failure to respond to deposited allegations awaiting a match, 
since with an independent escrow service the employer will be unaware of 
such allegations.  
A strong separation between the sponsoring institution and the escrow 
system is also important to protect the integrity of the allegation escrow sys-
tem. Both schools and employers have an interest in identifying potentially 
damaging types of behavior as soon as feasible, and in the absence of proper 
separation, these institutions may put pressure on the allegation escrow 
agents to look for and share evidence of that behavior. Both schools and 
employers may seek information about illegal activity, for example. Schools 
might want to know about academically dishonest or risk-taking behavior, 
while employers would be eager to know about employees embezzling or 
mishandling company resources. Nonetheless, using submitted allegations 
to identify such information would be a significant subversion and abuse of 
the system, as well as of the trust users had placed in the allegation escrow 
mechanism. The best defense against such unacceptable institutional en-
croachment is a firm and clearly delineated distinction between the  
third-party escrow provider and the sponsoring school or employer.  
d. The Escrow System’s Relationship with Users 
Tailoring the Service’s Core Ministerial Duties. In any allegation escrow 
mechanism, managing the relationship between the escrow system and the 
user is of critical importance. At a minimum, the escrow agent would owe to 
a depositor the duty of making good-faith efforts (1) to preserve the deposit; 
(2) to keep the deposit confidential both prerelease and postrelease (with 
regard to all except the prespecified recipients); (3) to inquire whether the 
deposit matches with other deposits (and meets the requisite for release); 
and (4) if the release is triggered, to forward matching deposits to the pre-
specified recipients. While game theorists tend to refer to the escrow service 
as an “agent” of the depositor, we tentatively think that the nonfiduciary 
contractual duties of good faith better balance the interest of the escrow 
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agent and the multiple depositors rather than turning the service into an 
agent with multiple principals.98 The escrow agreement between the deposi-
tor and the escrow service should establish the perception that the service is 
simply a ministerial channel through which allegations may pass. As with 
traditional escrows, these core duties are ministerial and largely nondiscre-
tionary. Indeed, one could imagine an escrow contract that minimized 
escrow release discretion. Under such a system, the service would not sub-
stantively review (or even access) the content of the complaints. It would 
merely test whether two deposits were directed toward an accused with the 
same identifying information, such as an email address, and only then re-
lease the deposits to the prespecified investigative entity. We tentatively 
reject such a pure ministerial system. 
To preserve the integrity of the escrow process, we recommend that the 
escrow contract specify that the escrow service have sole discretion to sub-
stantively review the content of deposits and have discretion not to forward 
deposits that the escrow service deems to be made in bad faith or to be in-
sufficient in substance to warrant matching. The purpose of such discretion 
is to protect both bona fide depositors and the accused from a release trig-
gered by complaints that the escrow agent deems to have been made in bad 
faith. Therefore, the contract ought to require complainants to acknowledge 
that the only way to ensure that someone will read the complaint is to pur-
sue a stand-alone complaint. The escrow agent should develop, but keep 
confidential, processes to help ensure that the deposits are made by bona 
fide complainants. For instance, by requiring depositors to demonstrate that 
they have access to a valid student or alumni email, the escrow agent can 
begin to ensure that the depositors have not misrepresented their names and 
have at one time been in residence at the university. Finally, the escrow sys-
tem should explicitly and clearly disclaim any responsibility for the content 
of the submissions and emphasize that depositors are warranting their repre-
                                                                                                                      
 98. See Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991). The 
Frey court notes that,  
[t]his duty [of good faith] is, as it were, halfway between a fiduciary duty (the duty of 
utmost good faith) and the duty merely to refrain from active fraud. . . . The concept of 
the duty of good faith like the concept of fiduciary duty is a stab at approximating the 
terms the parties would have negotiated had they foreseen the circumstances that have 
given rise to their dispute.  
Id. Fiduciary relationships are ill advised in part because different depositors might have con-
flicting views about whether two deposits are sufficiently matching to trigger an escrow 
release. As one author explains,  
[t]he flat commission custom can thus be understood as a kind of compromise which of-
fers the agent more of a return on marginal effort than does a flat-fee arrangement 
because it gives the agent a financial incentive to produce a higher rather than lower sale 
price, while greatly—but not entirely—reducing the conflict among principals, each of 
whom must still wonder whether the agent is maximizing joint revenue by preferring an-
other principal’s (more expensive) property. 
Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in Agency Arrangements: Lawyers, Real Estate 
Brokers, Underwriters, and Other Agents’ Rewards, 36 J.L. & Econ. 503, 508 (1993). 
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sentations to be true. Making clear that the escrow’s obligations are domi-
nantly ministerial will serve to minimize the risk that the escrow itself 
would be held liable for defamation.99 Moreover, the independence of the 
escrow from the employer may allay some victim concerns of institutional 
bias.100 
In a longer working paper version of this Article, we address in more de-
tail the legal and programming issues involved in our attempt to bring a 
harassment allegation escrow into being as a nonprofit internet website.101 But 
here we focus on a few game-theoretic choices about how to design the es-
crow agreement—choices concerning the escrow trigger and interim 
reporting—that might powerfully impact the escrow equilibrium. The trigger-
ing mechanisms determine the conditions under which the escrow deposits 
will be released, to whom the deposits will be released, and  
potentially for what purposes. Since the escrow mechanism is in essence a 
contract specifying the contractual duties of the escrow agent (who might or 
might not be a fiduciary of the depositor), escrow depositors might specify the 
contract in a variety of different ways—giving the depositors ex ante freedom 
and even various aspects of ex post freedom. One approach to choose among 
these particular design options would be to speculate about the types of con-
tractual terms that are most likely to be favored by the victim class.  
Tailoring the Disclosure Recipient. The mechanism might specify that 
upon receiving the prespecified number of matching deposits, the escrow 
agent would merely reveal the identity of the claimants to one another (or 
reveal their identity and their underlying claims) and let the claimants  
                                                                                                                      
 99. An escrow system would likely be immune from liability for defamation under 
section 230 the Communications Decency Act as an “interactive computer service provider” 
as long as it was clear that the submissions were provided by third parties and the website was 
not requiring or inducing users to post defamatory statements. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) 
(2006) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publish-
er or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”); Zeran v. 
Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (online bulletin board provider not liable 
for users’ defamatory messages). Even if section 230 immunity did not apply, it is likely that 
the qualified-privilege defense would shield the escrow service from defamation liability. This 
common-law defense to defamation protects speech made “to someone who may reasonably 
be expected to take official action to protect a public interest.” John Jay Fossett, Defamation in 
the Workplace: “The New Workhorse in Termination Litigation”, 15 N. Ky. L. Rev. 93, 105 
(1988) (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 115 
(W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984)). 
 100. As Jennie Kihnley points out in her 2000 article, schools in particular often express 
two semicontradictory aims of their sexual harassment–reporting processes: (1) to empower 
victims and reduce sexual harassment, and (2) to limit their own liability in any relevant litiga-
tion. Jennie Kihnley, Unraveling the Ivory Fabric: Institutional Obstacles to the Handling of 
Sexual Harassment Complaints, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 69, 70 (2000). The potential tension 
between these two goals can force complainants to navigate a confusing maze of administra-
tors and procedural rules. A relatively distant relationship between the complainant and the 
third-party escrow agent should help to clarify at least one part of the harassment grievance 
process. See id. at 72–73. 
 101. Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, You Are Not Alone (2012) (working paper) (on file with 
authors). 
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decide postmatch whether and how to proceed. Granting claimants this kind 
of ex post power might induce more deposits. On the other hand, it might 
also induce more fallacious deposits from individuals who merely make a 
deposit to learn the identity of other claimants. Because we want depositors 
to take the process seriously, and because we want to protect good-faith de-
positors from subversion of the system, we prefer a design where matched 
deposits are automatically forwarded to the proper authorities as actionable 
complaints. Potential depositors lose their own freedom not to proceed, but 
they gain the assurance that the claims of other depositors will be available 
for investigation. The relative inflexibility of automatic forwarding com-
bined with the formal or social consequences visited upon fallacious 
complaints may also reduce the number of false deposits and resulting Type 
II errors.  
Tailoring the Trigger. The mechanism must also specify the number of 
deposits lodged against a particular harasser that will trigger disclosure. We 
have thus far focused on an implementation where the escrow agent offers 
an across-the-board trigger of 2 (or possibly 3) deposits. But it would be 
possible to allow individual depositors to choose the trigger with which they 
are most comfortable. Under such a system, escrowed deposits would only 
be released if the set of deposits existed for which the trigger conditions 
were met for all the depositors in the set. For example, imagine a succession 
of deposits against a particular accused, where the claimants choose triggers 
of 4, 99, 2, 3, and 4. The third deposit would not trigger release, even 
though that depositor is comfortable with just two matching deposits, be-
cause there is not another depositor with a trigger of 2. The fourth deposit 
also would not trigger release because there are not three depositors with 
triggers of 3 or fewer (or subsets of two depositors with triggers of 2).102 
Like ex post control, we can imagine that an ex ante choice of trigger might 
increase deposits, and in particular might attract deposits from those com-
plainants who are the most reluctant to go it alone and feel secure only with 
many co-complainants. But it would be difficult to communicate the work-
ings of this escrow adequately to depositors—who might not realize that 
their escrow could be orphaned even though their personally chosen trigger 
requirement had been met. Moreover, our simulation leads us to think that 
depositor-chosen triggers are likely to lead in equilibrium to fewer harass-
ment investigations on net (even if there are more escrow deposits).103  
Tailoring Depositor Acceleration and Withdrawal Rights. The escrow 
contract must also specify whether a depositor can rescind or potentially 
accelerate the release of an as-of-yet unmatched claim deposit. Rescission 
and acceleration can be thought of as midstream alteration of the trigger 
                                                                                                                      
 102. It is possible that the first depositor (with a trigger of 4) would be happy to have her 
complaint released so long as four deposits had been placed in deposit, even though only three 
are releasable at the time of the match. 
 103. See supra Section II.A (discussing simulation with escrow trigger of 3 instead of 2). 
In addition, as with irretrievable complaints, the relative formality of a system-determined 
trigger might reduce the number of bad faith “fishing” and frivolous complaints deposited.  
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number. Rescission effectively increases the trigger number to some un-
reachably high number to ensure that the deposit would never be released. 
Acceleration has the effect of decreasing the trigger number—potentially to 
1, meaning that the claimant would be willing to “go it alone” and have her 
claim deposit forwarded immediately, unaccompanied by even a second 
claim. This is yet another dimension where theory and current data do not 
provide a clear, a priori solution. But we tentatively prefer an asymmetric 
system, in which a depositor can, anytime after making a deposit, accelerate 
her trigger to make a direct go-it-alone claim but cannot decelerate (or re-
scind) her deposit. We favor the acceleration option, because of the positive 
externalities of released claims. If a victim, after making a deposit, is willing 
to “go it alone,” it furthers her private interest and the public interest in ad-
judication and deterrence to immediately lodge the complaint on her 
behalf.104 Indeed, another advantage of the escrow system is that it can pro-
vide complainants with a simple method of creating a contemporaneous 
account of their allegations with the continuing possibility of turning the 
deposit into a go-it-alone complaint at any point in the future. Just the pro-
cess of privately giving voice to their narratives as part of making a deposit 
might be sufficient to make some victims willing to move forward by them-
selves. The process of naming and blaming can itself be transformative and 
lead to claiming.105  
The acceleration option might also be used by depositors who, over 
time, find themselves in a more empowered position. Indeed, because sexual 
harassment claims are subject to statutes of limitations, a depositor might 
eventually face a choice between submitting a direct complaint and forego-
ing the possibility of future litigation. By notifying depositors that the 
statute of limitations is about to run against the accused with regard to their 
claims, escrow agents might prompt depositors to transform an escrowed 
allegation into a go-it-alone complaint. Because we assume that most allega-
tion escrow users would remain silent in the absence of an escrow system, 
that transformation also encourages the submission of official complaints 
regarding incidents that would otherwise likely have gone unreported. Cre-
ating the acceleration option can thus mitigate the problem of orphaned 
deposits, which stands as a chief contraindication of implementing an es-
crow regime. 
The problem of orphaned escrows is also a chief reason why we (by a 
slight margin) prefer an asymmetric system where depositors cannot change 
their minds and rescind or cancel their deposit. Rescission or cancellation 
would effectively ensure that claims remain orphaned. Society would be 
deprived of the deterrence value of rescinded complaints. Moreover, we 
worry that rescindable deposits might be taken less seriously by depositors 
who retain the right to cancel if their deposit does not immediately match. 
We also worry that some depositors might too readily rescind if they find 
                                                                                                                      
 104. Owen M. Fiss famously wrote about the social values of public adjudication in 
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984). 
 105. See Felstiner et al., supra note 7, at 635–37. 
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that their deposits did not trigger an escrow release.106 These depositors 
would only make a short-term deposit to find out (by the immediate release) 
if another deposit was already outstanding against a particular professor. On 
the other hand, the requirement that escrows be nonrescindable might 
dampen the initial deposit rate more than the rescission option depresses the 
amount of deposits for potential match. In the absence of persuasive evi-
dence on this issue, we have a slight preference for making deposits 
nonrescindable for a period of one or two years. Temporary nonrescindabil-
ity makes clear to victims at the time of deposit that they cannot simply 
place a temporary deposit to test whether someone else has claimed against 
a particular professor. Depositors must be serious in making an escrow de-
posit because they will not be able to immediately change their minds about 
the fact of the matter at a later time.107 Depositors should be exposed to 
some negative scrutiny if they make a deposit that investigators later judge 
to be fallacious. 
Tailoring Interim Disclosures. Finally, the escrow contract should clear-
ly delineate the uses, if any, that might be made of deposit information while 
the complaint remains unmatched. For example, it would be possible for the 
escrow agent to inform the accused that an escrowed allegation had been 
levied against him without revealing the name of the accuser making the 
deposit. The goal of such interim disclosure would be to potentially deter 
the accuser from harassing other students because the accused would be on 
notice of a potential future investigation. An additional benefit would be that 
such a warning might induce an innocent defendant to submit a defense es-
crow report, should he be concerned that a particular disgruntled student 
might have submitted a false claim. However, the downside behind such 
interim disclosure to the accused is that it might trigger accuser retaliation 
against harassment victims.108 Accordingly, we propose a regime where in-
terim anonymous reports to the accused are not made, and indeed in which 
deposits are treated as if they are in a black box until matching. However, 
this treatment might merely be a default that individual depositors could 
contract around if they were comfortable in interim notice being made, such 
as when a student depositor limits her complaint to inappropriate professori-
al conduct in a large, lecture-based class. In that case, the complainant may 
be unwilling to make her allegations public in a go-it-alone fashion, but she 
may also feel confident that the accused will be unable to identify her after 
learning that a student in the lecture has submitted an escrowed complaint.  
                                                                                                                      
 106. There may be a first-mover disadvantage to making deposits to an escrow. The 
rescission option makes it potentially too easy for depositors who come to learn that they were 
the first to make an allegation deposit against a particular person to withdraw that deposit. 
 107. It would also be possible to construct a mechanism where deposits would become 
void if unmatched after a certain number of years—possibly tied to the relevant statute of 
limitations. 
 108. If interim disclosures to the harasser were made, it would be useful to only disclose 
with some randomized lag time so that the accused might have a harder time identifying who 
was making the allegation. But even with randomized lag times, harassers might be able to 
infer that a complaint was made by the student who was most recently harassed. 
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As we discuss in greater detail below, interim reports of varying granu-
larity might also be revealed to the public or the university to further other 
interests besides specific deterrence of the individual harasser. We favor dis-
closing to the public aggregate information on the number of allegation 
escrows that have been deposited with respect to employers with a suffi-
ciently substantial number of employees (combined with information on the 
number of deposits released from escrow). By letting victims know that oth-
er people have been making use of the escrow mechanism, disclosure can 
raise the salience of the mechanism, and perhaps lead to limited general 
deterrence by maintaining a visible enforcement presence on campus. It 
might even be possible to disclose the number of deposits for subgroups of 
workers (for example, for different schools within a university). The factors 
limiting the degree of granularity should be whether a harasser is likely to 
infer that a complaint has been deposited against him, and whether any 
member of the university is likely to infer who is submitting complaints. 
The total number of Yale University deposits increasing by one deposit tells 
a particular professor very little. But the total number of Yale Law School 
deposits increasing by one deposit might tell a harassing law professor 
(shortly after an episode of harassment) that he has been accused.109  
In thinking about interim reporting, we should distinguish between indi-
vidual malfeasance and institutional malfunction. Besides deterring individual 
acts of harassment, the escrows might be designed with an eye toward alerting 
human resource administrators about a more systemic problem. Instead of 
designing an escrow system to solely respond to the problem of repeated har-
assment by particular professors, it might also be possible to design a system 
to respond to more pervasively hostile educational or employment environ-
ments. For example, imagine that the escrow agent learns that seven 
harassment deposits have been received accusing different professors in the 
math department. Even if the individual deposits are not sufficient to sanction 
any of the individual professors, good-faith administrators might, if informed 
of the separate allegations, have sufficient evidence to take other kinds of ac-
tion to mitigate a hostile atmosphere in the department.110 Escrow designers 
should contemplate whether there could be different release triggers and po-
tentially different triggers for different types of proceedings or uses.111 Thus, 
                                                                                                                      
 109. For this reason, we also support regular and scheduled periods of aggregate report-
ing, such as twice per semester, so harassers are less likely to know specifically when 
complained-of conduct occurred. Similarly, we also support centralized reporting of such 
aggregate data, so the accused cannot be identified on the basis of their supervisor reporting 
incidents of harassment.  
 110. For example, administrators may employ sensitivity training to prevent sexual har-
assment. Kenneth M. York, Lizabeth A. Barclay & Amy B. Zajack, Preventing Sexual 
Harassment: The Effect of Multiple Training Methods, 10 Emp. Resps. & Rts. J. 277 (1997). 
 111. The Internal Revenue Service, for example, has successfully completed detailed 
audits of taxpayers with the understanding that the audits would only be used to assess the 
system levels of tax underpayment and not used to sanction those audited for any discovered 
underpayment of taxes. See Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Why Not? Winning the Audit Lottery, 
Forbes, Nov. 30, 2009, at 116. While we would argue strenuously against removing sanctions 
of the accused as a way of extracting aggregate or nontraditional data from escrowed  
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while the escrow agent might not publicly report department-specific escrow 
amounts, it might be useful to reveal these counts to administrators for de-
partments that display an inordinate number of deposits. It would be possible 
for the escrow agent to go beyond these more granular department-specific 
counts and reveal to the administration the allegations themselves. Indeed, the 
escrow mechanism might even include a second trigger specifying release if a 
certain number of deposits were received relating to a department during a 
particular period of time. Thus, a victim depositing an allegation against a 
math professor might know that the allegation will be made public if either (1) 
another allegation deposit is received relating to the same professor, or (2) 
three other allegation deposits are received relating to harassment in the math 
department during any three-year period. This second trigger would be better 
tailored to investigate and root out more pervasive atmospheres of harassment 
or discrimination. And as before, depositors could rest assured that they were 
not alone in making their allegation in the sense that the second trigger would 
only be met if four relatively contemporaneous claims of department harass-
ment were being made. We tentatively conclude against secondary triggers 
that complicate both agents’ matching process and the explanation that must 
be made to potential depositors.  
This brief discussion of triggers and interim reporting only scratches the 
surface of the manifold possibilities of escrow design. While allegation es-
crows initially seem as though they might be designed by a simple act of 
deposit and a subsequent release if prespecified conditions are met, we have 
shown that there are literally dozens of permutations on this basic design, as 
well as critical issues of judgment and context-specific tailoring. In the re-
mainder of this Part, we explore in greater detail some of the more practical 
issues in designing and launching an information escrow mechanism.  
2. Managing Salience 
Allegation escrow systems depend on sufficient user participation in 
order to fulfill the objective of lowering first-actor barriers to action and 
assisting communication. Perhaps the worst outcome for an allegation es-
crow system would be having all or nearly all submissions orphaned, as 
any complaints that would otherwise have been submitted directly would 
represent a net loss in the number of official allegations submitted by sex-
ual harassment victims.112 Maximizing the number of users113 is thus 
                                                                                                                      
complaints, we can imagine that many schools could find analogous ways of utilizing the 
information in escrowed complaints even before they were matched. Assuming sufficient 
complainant protections could be assured, such early uses of the complaints should serve 
current and future harassment victims, as well as the sponsoring institutions.  
 112. We consider such a negative net effect to be unlikely, even if few submissions are 
successfully matched. As with all areas of research on the underreporting of sexual harass-
ment, however, there is no way to be entirely certain in such predictions, and as a result we 
cannot discount the possibility entirely. 
 113. To be more precise, developers should seek to maximize the number of escrowed 
submissions from those harassment victims who would otherwise not submit go-it-alone com-
plaints.  
Ayres & Unkovic FTP5 B.doc 9/25/2012 2:07 PM 
November 2012] Information Escrows 185 
critical to minimizing the likelihood of an overall negative impact and max-
imizing the social and user utility of information escrows. 
Attracting submissions from complainants who would otherwise have 
remained silent presents two primary obstacles: exposure and user-perceived 
inertia. The success of an allegation escrow depends on a sufficient number 
of harassment victims being aware of the system and how to use it. Similar-
ly, it is critical to publicize effectively the confidentiality and other benefits 
of escrows to potential victims. However, escrow developers may also need 
to overcome a lack of faith in the system. Many complainants might consid-
er the hassle and emotional strain of submitting an escrowed allegation 
worthwhile only if there is a reasonable probability that other victims will 
participate. Users who perceive the escrow to be untried or unpopular may 
thus neglect to submit an allegation for fear that the system will not generate 
matches when appropriate. This inertia problem is self-perpetuating. To 
combat this risk, allegation escrow developers should address the marketing 
aspect of introducing the new system, as well as the problem of user-
confidence inertia. 
In our view, the first iterations of allegation escrows should follow the 
model established by the popular social networking site Facebook. Face-
book’s successful rollout strategy began by limiting the site to individual 
college campuses.114 The site was originally located at Harvard University 
where it was an immediate local sensation.115 It then moved to other Ivy 
League schools before being introduced at all U.S. and some non-U.S. uni-
versities.116 By the time Facebook was introduced to the general public, its 
popularity and reputation were well established.117 Following that pattern of 
success, allegation escrow systems should begin by targeting well-known 
universities, such as Yale, that are already publicly addressing Title IX, har-
assment reporting, and other gender-based issues. Having (hopefully) gained 
some public attention as a result, the allegation escrow system should then 
be introduced to other universities and educational communities. Finally, if 
the escrow systems are well received and their utility demonstrated, they 
should be expanded to groups, communities, and sectors beyond education. 
The purpose of a narrowly targeted rollout model is not to achieve or 
even aspire to the wild popularity of websites like Facebook and GMail, but 
rather is to take advantage of the built-in benefits that accompany locally 
tailored site introductions. Targeting universities for the first wave of allega-
tion escrows reduces the likelihood and severity of institutional resistance. 
As we mention above, many universities are already revamping their  
                                                                                                                      
 114. Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, Guardian, Jul. 24, 2007, http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia. 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. 
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harassment reporting processes or could benefit from doing so.118 Large-
scale employers, on the other hand, have several legal and practical reasons 
to resist allegation escrows for as long as possible. More importantly, target-
ing schools likely to respond positively to allegation escrows mitigates both 
marketing and inertia concerns. A closed universe of potential complainants 
and targets makes it easier to inform potential participants about the new 
escrow system and its benefits. Similarly, a limited population of partici-
pants and targets would reassure complainants that any potentially matching 
targets are almost certainly aware of the escrow system. Finally, beginning 
at schools that are already addressing Title IX, harassment reporting, and 
other gender-based issues fosters the recognition, enthusiasm, and energy 
that can lead to widespread use of allegation escrows.  
3. The Matching Algorithm 
Design of an algorithm to determine when two deposits match is an es-
sential part of escrow design. For example, while the foregoing examples 
concern matching of escrow deposits based on the identity of the individual 
harassers, one might instead design the escrow to allow matching on the 
basis of group identity, such as conduct by an entire department. Allowing 
group-based matching complicates any allegation escrow mechanism, but 
may be necessary to establish patterns of conduct for a proper investigation. 
However, group-based matching may require an increased level of participa-
tion by an escrow system agent, thereby introducing labor costs and the 
possibility of human error. Escrow developers would also have to decide 
whether to infer a group complaint from an individual complaint. For exam-
ple, six complaints each identifying a different faculty member in the math 
department could be forwarded as an anonymous group-based complaint. 
Finally, group-based matching would also probably require a separate and 
difficult-to-define triggering threshold for forwarding to officials and author-
ities.119  
Perhaps the most difficult challenge for the escrow agent reviewing 
matched allegations is ensuring that the allegations are similar enough to 
warrant forwarding. In the university context, for example, an allegation of a 
faculty member requesting sexual favors on the threat of grade retaliation is 
fundamentally different from a complaint that describes the same faculty 
member’s pattern of making inappropriate jokes in lecture. Both complaints 
                                                                                                                      
 118. Yale University is currently revamping its sexual harassment–reporting processes in 
response to recent complaints from students and Title IX investigators. As a result, Yale and 
similarly situated schools might be prime candidates for early rollout locations.  
 119. This difficulty results from differing group characteristics: should the large history 
department be subject to the same threshold as the tiny classics department? Should sports 
teams and student organizations be subject to a threshold applied to faculty? While selecting a 
blanket group–threshold would be difficult and perhaps ultimately unfair, so too would pre-
defining an appropriate threshold for all possible groups. Group matching might, however, be 
a realistic goal for subsequent iterations of allegation escrow systems that can benefit from 
early experiences at a given institution.  
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are entirely valid and legitimate, but describe behavior of vastly different 
severity. Many escrow systems may treat the two claims as different enough 
that they fail to trigger a forwarded match, for fear that the complainant al-
leging the more serious conduct would essentially be placed in a position 
very similar to the one she avoided by refusing to submit a go-it-alone com-
plaint.120 The difficulty in making this judgment is determining where to 
draw the line between matched allegations that are similar enough to trigger 
official reporting and those that are not. Inevitably, many of the matched 
allegations will present close calls, significantly complicating the review 
process.121  
The consequences of delaying matched allegations are potentially signif-
icant. At minimum, a screener’s choice to treat two matched allegations as 
fundamentally different increases the risk that both allegations will be func-
tionally orphaned. In addition, because this dilemma implies that one of the 
complaints alleges serious harassment, even a short delay in forwarding 
matched allegations exposes the complainants and others to the risk of con-
tinued harm. On the other hand, the screener must assume that but for the 
option of waiting for a sufficient match, the complainant would have chosen 
to remain silent. To the extent that officially submitting two vastly different 
claims effectively forces the users to go it alone, forwarding poorly matched 
allegations subverts the aims of the allegation escrow system and directly 
harms complainants. Ultimately, the screener should decide whether to err 
on the side of over- or underreporting matched allegations, and then accept 
that some controversial or regrettable decisions are inevitable.122  
III. Applications 
Information escrows have a broad range of potential applications in ad-
dition to our central example of sexual harassment complaints. In this Part, 
we will rely on the theoretical foundation developed in Part II to explore 
whether the prerequisites for useful application of the escrow tool exist. The 
goal of this Part then is to identify new potential applications and to assess 
whether an escrow is likely to be on net socially beneficial.  
                                                                                                                      
 120. Of course, some escrow system developers might forward any matched, good-faith 
allegations. Such a decision would simplify the review process significantly and lower the risk 
of unnecessarily orphaned claims. At worst, however, it could also lead to go-it-alone style 
harms for some users, thus negating the purpose of the system as a whole. A pattern of such 
harms might ultimately also have a chilling effect on submissions.  
 121. Of particular relevance in this decisionmaking process would be the screener’s 
guess as to the preferences of the complainant submitting the more serious allegation. 
 122. As with information security here too, independence from the sponsoring institution 
and its liability-generating responsibilities becomes important.  
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A. Applications for Allegation Escrows 
1. Sexual Harassment, Date Rape, and Other Sexual Assaults 
It is common in high-profile incidents of sexual harassment to have oth-
er victims step forward with similar accusations. Perhaps the most currently 
salient and disturbing is the story of Jerry Sandusky, who was a popular de-
fensive coordinator for the Pennsylvania State University football team. 
After Sandusky’s arrest in early November 2011 on charges of child moles-
tation, ten additional victims came forward and alleged similar abuse.123 The 
tremendous damage that the university suffered as a result of the sheer num-
ber of accusations, to say nothing of the harm to the children, highlights 
both why schools might feel pressure to uncover as many claims of abuse as 
possible, and why they might benefit from the use of allegation escrow sys-
tems in that effort.  
Stories of high-profile follow-on complaints are also common in nation-
al and global politics. Shortly after Nafissatou Diallo’s accusation led to 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn being charged with sexual assault,124 Tristane 
Banon, a French journalist, publicly accused Strauss-Kahn of attempted 
rape.125 We saw this same pattern when Bill Clinton was accused of multiple 
instances of sexual misconduct throughout the 1990s in the wake of the Pau-
la Jones sexual harassment lawsuit.126  
                                                                                                                      
 123. See Mark Viera & Jo Becker, Ex-Coach Denies Charges Amid New Accusations, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 2011, at B13, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/sports/ncaafootball/ 
jack-raykovitz-chief-of-second-mile-resigns-amid-penn-state-scandal.html. If true, the charges 
against Sandusky suggest that he repeatedly and severely sexually abused young boys in his 
care. Beyond the indescribable tragedy of the harm done to the children, the scandal surround-
ing Sandusky’s arrest has already had a profound impact on Penn State as an institution. See 
id.  
 124. See Al Baker & Steven Erlanger, I.M.F. Chief, Apprehended at Airport, Is Accused 
of Sexual Attack, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2011, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/ 
nyregion/imf-head-is-arrested-and-accused-of-sexual-attack.html.  
 125. See Maïa de la Baume, A Writer Frees Herself by Speaking Out, N.Y. Times, July 
23, 2011, at A6, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/world/europe/23banon.html. Neither 
case was successful, as U.S. prosecutors eventually dropped all charges against Strauss-Kahn 
and French prosecutors declined to pursue criminal charges as well. See Steven Erlanger & 
Maïa de la Baume, Strauss-Kahn Is Not Charged in French Case, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2011,  
at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/14/world/europe/dominique-strauss-kahn-cleared-of-
attempted-rape-of-tristane-banon.html. John Eligon, Strauss-Kahn Drama Ends with Short 
Final Scene, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 2011, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/ 
nyregion/charges-against-strauss-kahn-dismissed.html.  
 126. See Francis X. Clines, Testing of a President: The Accuser; Jones Lawyers Issue 
Files Alleging Clinton Pattern of Harassment of Women, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1998, at A1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/14/us/testing-president-accuser-jones-lawyers-issue-files-
alleging-clinton-pattern.html (reporting attempt “to portray Mr. Clinton as repeatedly  
engaging in sexual harassment of female underlings from his executive positions in gov-
ernment,” including testimony from Kathleen Willey); Francis X. Clines & Jeff Gerth, The 
President Under Fire: The Overview; Subpoenas Sent as Clinton Denies Reports  
of an Affair with Aide at White House, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1998, at A1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/22/us/president-under-fire-overview-subpoenas-sent-clinton-
denies-reports-affair-with.html (reporting the Monica Lewinsky scandal); Woman Says Clinton 
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Beyond these high-profile cases, however, empirical studies on sexual 
harassment support the idea that information escrow systems can add value 
to current reporting systems. Escrow systems are of course useful only in-
asmuch as a perpetrator is likely to harass multiple victims. An early study 
on sexual harassment in the federal government found that “many women 
and men reported that their harasser had also bothered others at work.”127 A 
more recent statistical study based on labor arbitration decisions summa-
rized the number of victims per perpetrator:128 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variables M SD N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Number of 
targets 
2.32 2.12 92 -        
. . .            
8. Number of 
incidents 
4.77 3.58 92 .32 .09 .18 .30 .42 .38 .55 - 
Data from Margaret A. Lucero et al., An Empirical Investigation of Sexual Harassers: Toward a Perpe-
trator Typology, 56 Hum. Rel. 1461, 1470 (2003). 
 
This data indicates that perpetrators of sexual harassment typically harass 
multiple victims, comporting with research that has found a recidivism rate 
for general sex offenders of 61.1 percent.129 
Nonetheless, there are significant barriers to reporting sexual harass-
ment, thus making it difficult to assess the extent of the problem. Studies 
seeking to measure the incidence and prevalence of sexual harassment tend 
to rely on surveys that, while useful, are subject to selective response, lack 
of response, and other methodological issues.130 A leading direct survey 
suggests that the prevalence of sexual harassment on postsecondary campuses 
remains shockingly high.131 Of those students surveyed, 62% indicated that 
they had been sexually harassed in some way.132 Even more alarming, in a 
phone survey, 2.8% of the college women respondents indicated that they had 
                                                                                                                      
Made Advance in ‘91, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1994, at A8, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1994/02/12/us/woman-says-clinton-made-advance-in-91.html (reporting the Paula Jones sexu-
al harassment lawsuit). 
 127. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace: 
Is It a Problem? 25 (1981), available at http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx? 
docnumber=240744&version=241014&application=ACROBAT. 
 128. Margaret A. Lucero et al., An Empirical Investigation of Sexual Harassers: Toward 
a Perpetrator Typology, 56 Hum. Rel. 1461, 1470 (2003). 
 129. Ron Langevin et al., Lifetime Sex Offender Recidivism: A 25-Year Follow-Up Study, 
46 Canadian J. Criminology & Crim. Just. 531, 545 (2004). 
 130. For a discussion of the concerns associated with direct surveys asking questions 
about sensitive topics, see Arijit Chaudhuri & Rahul Mukerjee, Randomized Response: 
Theory and Techniques 2–24 (1988). We also imagine that the data available from surveys 
seeking to identify perpetrators of sexual harassment on college campuses is particularly vul-
nerable to such concerns.  
 131. See AAUW Report, supra note 1.  
 132. Id. at 15 fig.2. 
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experienced either an attempted or a completed rape133 in the previous 6.91 
months.134 A follow-up study further found that just 4% of rape victims in-
form a college official, while only 2.1% of victims report incidents to 
police.135 Finally, a 2007 study found that college rape victims are more 
likely than victims of other types of crime to be repeat victims.136 Such re-
peat victimization may contribute to a high rate of underreporting, 
particularly when measured on an incident-by-incident basis.  
There is reason to be skeptical of the conclusions in both of these stud-
ies, since the very factors that make underreporting a problem may also lead 
to unreliable responses to a direct survey. Studies focusing on existing re-
ports are clearly insufficient, and surveys are both highly sensitive to design 
issues and notoriously inaccurate.137 School administrators and policymak-
ers do not need to know the full and precise extent of sexual harassment on 
campus, however, to recognize that both harassment and underreporting are 
serious problems. Because the likelihood that matched reporting will aug-
ment total reports increases as the prevalence and underreporting138 of 
harassment rise, the data above suggest that colleges and universities are 
good candidates for allegation escrow systems.  
Studies addressing sexual harassment among working adults indicate 
that the prevalence of sexual harassment in the workplace is equally alarm-
ing. Some studies suggest that perhaps as many as 50 percent of women in 
the workplace have experienced some type of sexual harassment and that 
harassment targets tend to be repeat victims.139 Female employees also often 
decline to apply the “harassment” label to incidents that otherwise meet all 
definitions of sexual harassment, perhaps in an effort to improve their work-
ing environments by ignoring inappropriate conduct, or because they are 
reluctant to acknowledge that the incidents have upset them.140 As with edu-
                                                                                                                      
 133. Under Title IX, rape and sexual assault are considered serious, violent forms of 
sexual harassment. 
 134. Bonnie S. Fisher, Francis T. Cullen & Michael G. Turner, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, NCJ 182369, The Sexual Victimization of College Women 10 (2000).  
 135. Fisher et al., supra note 55, at 24.  
 136. Christopher P. Krebs, Christine H. Lindquist, Tara D. Warner, Bonnie S. 
Fisher & Sandra L. Martin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Campus Sexual Assault (CSA) 
Study 2-5 to -6 (2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf. 
 137. For a discussion of surveys and studies measuring the prevalence of rape, see Bon-
nie S. Fisher, Measuring Rape Against Women: The Significance of Survey 
Questions (2004), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/199705.pdf.  
 138. Or, more accurately, the likelihood that information escrow systems will support 
reporting increases as the rate of underreporting that would be reported via allegation escrow 
systems rises.  
 139. Kimberly T. Schneider, Suzanne Swan & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Job-Related and 
Psychological Effects of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence from Two 
Organizations, 82 J. Applied Psychol. 401, 402 (1997).  
 140. E.g., Beth A. Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining: Law, Humor, and Harassment in 
the Everyday Work World, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1151, 1151, 1167, 1181 (2000). However, 
because the experience of sexually harassing behavior is formed in large part by the reactions 
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cational settings, data indicating a high prevalence of sexual harassment in 
the workplace suggest that workplace harassment reporting may be a partic-
ularly promising application for information escrow systems.  
2. Whistle-blowing and Allegations of Nonsexual Wrongdoing 
Beyond our principal examples of sexual harassment reporting in uni-
versities and workplaces, properly tailored allegation escrow systems have 
the potential to significantly and positively impact information sharing not 
only with regard to other types of harassment and discrimination, but also 
with regard to a wide variety of other types of misconduct. The allegation 
escrow tool could be deployed to ameliorate potential first-mover claiming 
disadvantages regarding whistle-blowing. The antiretaliation protections 
afforded to whistle-blowers141 are not always sufficient to allay a potential 
whistle-blower’s concerns that she will be subjected to serious social and 
economic consequences if she reports. For example, the Los Angeles Police 
Department (“LAPD”) formerly had a practice of assigning reporting offic-
ers to “freeway therapy,” whereby the offending reporters would encounter 
punitive transfer far from their homes and colleagues, thereby also signifi-
cantly extending their commutes.142 Unofficial retaliation need not be so 
blatant to effectively deter reports of wrongdoing. Whistle-blowers often 
worry that they will be labeled “troublemakers,” passed over for promotion 
when more than one equally qualified candidate exists, and suffer social 
consequences in the workplace.143 Matched reports of wrongdoing in the 
workplace would benefit from the credibility enhancing and group-safety 
functions of allegation escrows. While an escrow would probably not  
                                                                                                                      
of the recipient, it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to identify which of those women 
who resist the term “harassment” do so for which reasons. 
 141. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2087 (2006) (protecting employees from retaliation for reporting 
violations of safety rules under jurisdiction of Consumer Product Safety Commission); 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A (2006) (establishing broad protections for whistle-blowers complaining of 
fraud or violations of securities laws); 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation 
against employees who complain or testify about violations of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act). See generally Employment Law Guide: Whistleblower and Retaliation Protec-
tions, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/compliance/guide/whistle.htm (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2011). 
 142. One veteran LAPD officer claimed in 2008 that he’d been demoted and subjected 
to freeway therapy for defending a female colleague after she was harassed and discrimi-
nated against on the basis of her gender. In a lawsuit about the retaliation, he described 
being removed from his K-9 unit and assigned to a division that was a four-hour commute 
from his home. A Los Angeles jury awarded him $3.6 million in damages, and he agreed to 
collect $2.5 million from the city in return for the city’s agreement to forgo appeals.  
Victoria Kim, Jury Awards Damages to Officer, L.A. Times, Nov. 13, 2008, at B1, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/15/10cal/me-lapd13.  
 143. See generally Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Retaliation Against Whistle Blow-
ers: Predictors and Effects, 71 J. Applied Psychol. 137–45 (1986) (discussing relationship 
between whistle-blowing and retaliation); Marcia A. Parmerlee, Janet P. Near & Tamila C. 
Jensen, Correlates of Whistle-Blowers’ Perceptions of Organizational Retaliation, 27 Admin. 
Sci. Q. 17 (1982) (exploring organizational responses to whistle-blowing and identifying 
factors that increase likelihood of retaliation). 
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eliminate unofficial retribution, it would make egregious patterns easier to 
prevent, identify, and prove. 
Moreover, directed allegation escrow systems could benefit users any-
time there is reason to establish a credible record of repeated conduct before 
making a public complaint. For example, individual citizen oversight of 
complaints of police or other government misconduct may fail to attract 
attention in the absence of strong community support. What’s more, state 
authorities have been criticized for making little more than perfunctory in-
vestigations of citizen complaints unless and until a pattern of misconduct 
has been established.144 Establishing such a pattern presents a problem to 
complainants, however, since allegations lodged after an initial go-it-alone 
complaint can be accused of copycatting. Escrow systems that allow com-
munities or groups to collect a set of complaints before making them public 
might thus help to both establish a pattern of wrongdoing and support the 
credibility of the individual complaints. 
Allegation escrows could also ameliorate first-mover disadvantages 
when bringing private qui tam actions. Under the False Claims Act, a private 
party may bring a civil action in the name of the United States against a de-
fendant for defrauding the government.145 To encourage such private suits, 
the Act establishes an award of up to 30 percent of the proceeds of the ac-
tion, depending on whether the Department of Justice subsequently 
intervenes in the case.146 Moreover, the Act expressly limits this right to the 
first person to bring the claim.147 Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act established 
a whistle-blower program awarding 10 to 30 percent of the proceeds ob-
tained from original information leading to the successful enforcement of 
securities laws.148 Thus at first glance, these Acts seem to establish a  
first-mover advantage. However, a complainant might worry that she lacks 
sufficient proof to prevail alone, and may wish to proceed only with other 
plaintiffs. This is a particularly poignant concern because despite statutory 
antiretaliation protections,149 case law has recognized the right of qui tam 
defendants to bring counterclaims against whistle-blowers.150 A potential qui 
                                                                                                                      
 144. See, e.g., Christine Hauser, Embattled Chief Leaves Police Review Board, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 2, 2009, at A24. The New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board has a man-
date to investigate every complaint received and refers the complaint to the New York Police 
Department if found to be substantiated. See N.Y.C. Civilian Complaint Review Bd., Fre-
quently Asked Questions, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/faq.html (last visited Oct. 2, 
2011). 
 145. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006). 
 146. Id. § 3730(d). 
 147. Id. § 3730(b)(5). 
 148. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6 (West Supp. 2012). 
 149. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). 
 150. E.g., United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, 931 F. Supp. 248, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(“[T]he modern trend does not support a ban on compulsory counterclaims which are based on 
damages which are ‘independent’ of the qui tam claim.” (citing United States ex rel. Madden 
v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 4 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 1993))); Burch ex rel. United States v. Piqua 
Eng’g, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 452, 455–57 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (compulsory counterclaims must be 
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tam plaintiff might justifiably worry that she could be exposed to substantial 
liability were she not to prevail. Allegation escrows thus provide “safety in 
numbers.”  
While whistle-blowers are often insiders employed by an entity engaged 
in wrongful conduct, the example of adverse drug events (“ADE”s) shows 
that escrows might encourage reports of different kinds of information by 
corporate outsiders. Pharmaceutical manufacturers are required to report 
adverse reactions reasonably related to the use of a drug.151 But patients and 
physicians are often reluctant to submit voluntary ADE reports because they 
lack incentive to report and fear negative repercussions or embarrassment if 
prescription error or patient noncompliance is blamed.152 An allegation es-
crow could lead to greater reporting of ADEs by reducing the risk of 
embarrassment or negative consequences from direct communication. 
Moreover, an allegation escrow system could also take into account individ-
ual reports of the severity and types of reactions, addressing the concern that 
current reporting leads to little continuity of care when physicians assess the 
severity of reactions.153 Nonetheless, ADE escrows would require a signifi-
cantly higher threshold to trigger the release of allegations, perhaps a level 
similar to the 10,000 ADEs submitted to the FDA when physicians began to 
publicize concerns with the controversial diabetes medicine Avandia.154 Fi-
nally, because ADE submissions are controlled by the Health Insurance 
                                                                                                                      
permitted for due process reasons despite the seemingly contradictory intent of the False 
Claims Act). 
 151. See MedWatch: The FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting Pro-
gram, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/Safety/MedWatch/default.htm (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2011); EudraVigiliance, Eur. Meds. Agency, http://www.ema.europa.eu/ 
ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/regulation/document_listing/document_listing_000239.jsp&murl=
menus/regulations/regulations.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac05800250b5 (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). In 
December 2010, the European Parliament and European Council adopted a regulation and 
directive updating the adverse drug reaction reporting system in the European Union. The new 
legislation went into effect in July 2012 and will change the way that both pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and physicians report adverse reactions. The basic system will remain volun-
tary for physicians, and thus should still be considered “passive oversight.” Both Regulation 
(EU) No. 1235/2010 and Directive 2010/84/EU are available at 2010 Pharmacovigilance 
Legislation, Eur. Meds. Agency, http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/ 
regulation/general/general_content_000492.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac058033e8ad (last visited 
May 6, 2012). 
 152. Patient noncompliance, both intentional and unintentional, is exceedingly common 
and is also responsible for a nontrivial proportion of ADEs. Prescription error is much less 
common but by no means unheard of. Drugs with similar sounding names, for example, can 
lead to prescription errors. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Adverse Drug Effects, 
GAO/HEHS-00-21 at 6–8 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00021.pdf. 
 153. For more on the disparity of judgments among physicians, see Jeffrey A. Linder et 
al., Secondary Use of Electronic Health Record Data: Spontaneous Triggered Adverse Drug 
Event Reporting, 19 Pharmacoepidemiology & Drug Safety 1211 (2010). 
 154. Based on a search of FDAble.com, a private, for-profit website that makes the 
FDA’s ADE database publicly available. See Search MedWatch Drug Adverse Events (AERS), 
FDAble, http://www.fdable.com/advanced_aers_query (last searched Aug. 28, 2011). 
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Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”),155 patients would 
benefit from legal protections against the use of their medical information 
outside of the safety-review context, but the potentially serious consequenc-
es of an accidental or bad-faith breach of confidentiality significantly 
increases the importance of information security measures.156 Nonetheless, 
given the current underreporting of ADEs, an ADE escrow may ultimately 
prove worthwhile. 
In some settings, insider or outsider whistle-blowers might prefer to cre-
ate informant escrows, which prespecify conditions of release of allegations 
to newspapers or other media outlets to ensure further protection against 
retaliation.157 When government or corporate actors are unwilling or are per-
ceived to be unwilling to take appropriate action, whistle-blowers may 
prefer to spark a public debate by prompting news coverage of some contro-
versial set of facts. Informant escrows can analogously allay the retaliation 
fears of potential sources by adding to a reporter’s anonymity the assurance 
that the reporter has multiple sources. 
3. Suspicion Escrows 
Allegation escrows might also be useful where individuals suspect mis-
conduct on the part of another. For example, mutual friends of a married 
couple might be aware of one spouse’s unfaithfulness, but hesitate to tell the 
other spouse for fear of having mistakenly construed the situation. This type 
of situation demonstrates the problem of wrongdoing uncertainty discussed 
above.158 An allegation escrow would permit friends to report a suspicion of 
adultery that would only be forwarded if a triggering number of other suspi-
cion reports were received. Setting the appropriate threshold for forwarding 
such suspicion reports would seem to present a challenge, but an average of 
users’ estimates of the number of other individuals aware of the misconduct 
might be the best approach. Moreover, suspicion escrows might benefit from 
optional reporting anonymity to encourage friends to share their suspicions 
without the risk of endangering their relationships with either spouse. 
In designing suspicion escrows, it is important to keep in mind that the 
intended beneficiary may not wish to receive the information. Some spouses 
may prefer ignorance to unproven allegations of adultery. As discussed 
                                                                                                                      
 155. For more information on HIPAA and its scope, see The Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy and Security Rules, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Hum. Servs., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). 
 156. See generally MedWatch Online Voluntary Reporting Form, U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/medwatch/medwatch-online.htm (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2011). Despite the fairly strict HIPAA requirements governing the release of patient 
information, drug manufacturers are still required to submit some types of ADE reports, and 
encouraged to submit as many as possible. See id. 
 157. However, releasing reports to media outlets might expose the escrow service to 
defamation liability for abuse of the qualified privilege. See supra note 99 (discussing defama-
tion and privilege). 
 158. See supra text accompanying notes 54–56. 
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above, suspicion escrows could be designed with either a presumption of 
victim interest or disinterest—allowing the victim spouses to “opt-in” or 
“opt-out” of receiving suspicion reports. To preserve the victim spouse’s 
interest in not knowing, we favor suspicion escrows that presume disinterest 
and accordingly require victims to affirmatively opt in to receiving escrow 
disclosures. As such, suspicion escrows combine aspects of both allegation 
and shared-interest approaches. A related approach might notify users that 
the threshold number of reports has been reached, thereby enabling any user 
to notify the beneficiary that she may wish to opt in and learn of the suspi-
cion. Finally, as the example of Iago teaches,159 the harm resulting from 
collusive or bad-faith suspicions could be substantial: a spouse may be una-
ble to repair the damage to the relationship. As with shared-interest escrows, 
an opt-in approach can minimize this harm by ensuring that spouses volun-
tarily expose themselves to suspicion information with full knowledge of the 
risk of bad-faith or collusive reports. 
4. Insecurity Escrows 
A variation on suspicion escrows could ease communication in sensitive 
group settings. Often delicate questions arise for which one might desire 
honest feedback from trusted friends and colleagues, but social customs, 
insecurities, and concerns about awkwardness prevent a forthright conversa-
tion. For example, a professor might wonder if his colleagues think it is time 
for him to retire, or if his lectures are boring. On a more personal level, a 
person might want to ask friends whether his recent weight gain is  
noticeable, or whether he has bad breath. Often, his friends, for fear of pro-
voking hurt feelings, anger, or awkwardness in the relationship, will offer 
nothing by means of direct communication but politically correct platitudes 
or tempered opinions. 
One way to gather information ambiguously and indirectly is through 
anonymous surveys such as Survey Monkey and Google Surveys. While 
perhaps better than a direct conversation, such web-based and purportedly 
anonymous surveys also include several drawbacks. A colleague might fear 
that his responses would be identifiable. For example, if everyone who re-
ceives the survey gives the same answer, then the professor would be able to 
infer that all of his colleagues think it is time for him to retire. The colleague 
might also worry that if nobody responds, the professor would be able to 
infer that each colleague failed to respond to the survey request.  
An insecurity escrow could minimize these concerns. For example, an 
insecurity escrow might (1) only report a random subset of anonymous re-
sponses and (2) only report the random subset if a minimum number of 
responses is received. Thus, if a professor asked ten colleagues for an opin-
ion, the escrow would only report the anonymous results if at least five 
                                                                                                                      
 159. See William Shakespeare, Othello, the Moore of Venice act 3, sc. 3, where 
Iago engineers a scheme to convince Othello that his wife Desdemona is having an affair with 
Cassio by planting Desdemona’s handkerchief in Cassio’s room. 
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colleagues responded and only send on five responses—choosing five at 
random from the submitted responses. Unlike other shared-interest escrows, 
an insecurity escrow seeks to fulfill a shared interest while preserving a lack 
of common knowledge as to respondents’ identities and opinions. The trig-
gering threshold ensures that the requesting party could never conclude that 
no one had responded to his request for information. Similarly, to preserve 
this ambiguity, respondents would never know whether their feedback was 
actually forwarded. Finally, the random sampling process would ensure that 
only a subset of actual responses would be reported to the requesting party. 
This random subsampling would preserve ambiguity as to whether the re-
sults reflected the entire group invited to respond.  
Conclusion 
This Article has tried to do three things. First, in providing a metatheory 
for information escrows, we have tried to reveal relationships between a 
wide array of existing practices. Seen through the lens of information es-
crows, one can see connections among the disparate practices of everything 
from Cybersettle and criminal expungements, to adoption consent registries 
and even GoodCrush. In each of these contexts, private information is de-
posited with an escrow agent who is only to pass on the information under 
prespecified conditions. 
Second, we have tried to suggest other contexts where information es-
crows might provide value. In addition to explaining existing practice, we 
have tried to show that a better understanding of information escrows can 
help generate new areas where they might be beneficially deployed. We 
have suggested a dizzying array of possibilities—including insecurity es-
crows, shared-interest escrows, and even suspicion escrows—as well as 
highlighting a number of crosscutting design choices—including, for exam-
ple, presumed consent and interim reporting—which give greater flexibility 
in managing the potentially disruptive impacts of common knowledge. 
Third, we have gone beyond a cataloging of mere possibilities to provide 
sustained arguments for deploying sexual-harassment-complaint escrows 
and workplace-dating escrows. Our theory provides no a priori arguments in 
favor of escrows, but it does suggest conditions when intermediated com-
munication by escrow agents can produce socially enhanced equilibria. Our 
core application of allegation escrows concerning sexual-harassment-
complaint escrows might alleviate the currently significant underreporting 
problem and trigger more investigations with more credible evidence. Ex-
tending the information escrow idea to this new context might play a role in 
improving the quality of life in our places of work. 
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